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INTRODUCTION
Why are certain burdens called "taxes" and others not? What con-
sequences flow from characterizing a burden as a tax? Or, put more
directly, why might you actively seek to characterize a burden as a tax on
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Chodorow, Bridget Crawford, Leandra Lederman, and Beverly Moran for their
comments on earlier drafts of this Article. I would also like to thank participants in
law faculty workshops at Pace Law School and the University of Cincinnati for their
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the family and taxation at the 2009 annual meeting of the Association of American
Law Schools and those who attended my presentation of this Article at the 2008 an-
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the University of Pittsburgh School of Law for providing financial support for the
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someone or something? Once classified as a tax, how do we determine
whether a given burden is fair? Or, again to put the question more di-
rectly, should we take into account noneconomic characteristics-for
example, sexual orientation-when determining the fairness of a tax? In
this Article, I begin to address these separate, yet interrelated questions
in the context of the burdens imposed on same-sex couples by the De-
fense of Marriage Act' (DOMA) and its state-level analogues, the so-
called mini-DOMAs.2 (For purposes of this Article, I will sometimes
collectively refer to DOMA and the mini-DOMAs as "the DOMAs.")
I was moved to ask and explore these questions by my work on the
gay and lesbian title of Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic's "Everyday
Law" series.! While working on the chapters on marriage and its alterna-
tives, medical and financial planning, and parenting, I was struck by the
practical impact of the DOMAs on same-sex couples living in states that
permit them to enter into marriages, civil unions, or domestic partner-
ships. At first glance, these couples seem to be presented with the same
choice as different-sex couples when the time comes to consider whether
to seek legal recognition of their relationships: They can either choose to
enter into a state-sanctioned legal relationship or to create a legal
framework for their relationship through private contractual arrange-
ments. In practice, however, the DOMAs render this seeming choice a
false one.
The ostensible purpose of the DOMAs is quite simple. They aim to
cabin in any gains that same-sex couples make in their effort to achieve
access to the rights and obligations of marriage. For example, Congress
enacted the federal DOMA in 1996 out of fear that, left unchecked, a
then-anticipated decision from the Hawaii Supreme Court legally rec-
ognizing same-sex relationships' would spread throughout the country
like some sort of contagion. Yet, as described more fully in Part I below,
the DOMAs do far more than simply stave off the spread of same-sex
marriage; they effectively erode the important civil rights gains attained
in states such as California, Connecticut, Iowa, Massachusetts, Nevada,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oregon, and Vermont, which either rec-
1. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified in scattered sections of 1
U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.)
2. See infra Part L.A for a description of the federal DOMA and the state mini-DOMAs.
3. ANTHONY C. INFANTI, EVERYDAY LAW FOR GAYS AND LESBIANS (AND THOSE WHO
CARE ABOUT THEM) (2007).
4. See H.R REP. No. 104-664, at 6-11 (1996).
5. In fact, the decision never materialized because, while an appeal was pending to the
Hawaii Supreme Court, the state constitution was amended to empower the state leg-
islature to limit marriage to different-sex couples. INFANTI, supra note 3, at 145.
6. See H.R REP. No. 104-664, supra note 4, at 2-3.
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ognize same-sex marriage or a legally equivalent relationship (i.e., civil
unions or domestic partnerships).' The erosion of these gains occurs be-
cause same-sex couples who enter into legally recognized relationships in
these states must still engage in all of the same legal planning as couples
who choose not to (or simply cannot) enter into such relationships.
They face a false choice between a state-sanctioned legal relationship or
private ordering of their relationship because it is practically impossible
for same-sex couples to avoid either (1) traveling to or interacting with
persons located in states that have enacted a mini-DOMA and therefore
refuse legal recognition to their relationship or (2) having dealings with
the federal government that somehow implicate its DOMA, which simi-
larly refuses legal recognition to their relationship.
When I looked at this false choice problem and the very real-and
very expensive-costs that many states and the federal government im-
pose on same-sex couples,' I realized that these costs look very much like
a tax designed to penalize same-sex couples for seeking recognition of
their familial relationships (i.e., the relationship between the members of
the couple and between the couple and their children). Indeed, I in-
cluded a couple of passing references in the book to this effect,
remarking on how the DOMAs significantly reduce the lesbian and gay
movement's civil rights gains in the state-by-state battles for access to
marriage and leave same-sex couples with only the "after-tax" gains from
any victories.! With the book complete and now in print, I have had
more time to reflect on this question of taxing civil rights gains and its
implications, and that reflection has led to the writing of this Article.
In this Article, I make the case for reconceptualizing the DOMAs
as a form of tax; namely, a tax on lesbian and gay families. This recon-
ceptualization naturally raises the question of what precisely qualifies as
a "tax"-a question that I consider at some length in Part II below. But
it also raises a number of ancillary questions, too. For instance, I imag-
ine that some readers might, if they could, stop me now to ask, "why
bother?" or "what's the point of calling this burden a 'tax'?"
7. Though civil unions and domestic partnerships are the legal equivalent of marriage in
these states, civil unions and domestic partnerships prove to be far from the equiva-
lent of marriage in practice. Eg., N.J. CIVIL UNION REVIEW COMM'N, THE LEGAL,
MEDICAL, ECONOMIC & SOCIAL. CONSEQUENCES OF NEW JERSEY'S CIVIL UNION LAW
8-15 (2008), available at http://www.nj.gov/oag/dcr/downloads/CURC-Final-
Report-.pdf.
8. But, of course, not on different-sex couples, whose marriages are routinely recognized
from one state to another and by the federal government. See infra note 44 and ac-
companying text.
9. See INFANTI, supra note 3, at 159, 223.
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At one level, as I also discuss in Part II below, the point of labeling
the burden imposed by the DOMAs a "tax" is purely rhetorical. Calling
the DOMAs a tax may be an effective means of countering the notion
that these measures are a necessary "defense" of marriage against an as-
sault by same-sex couples. In this context, the "tax" label instead conveys
the message that the DOMAs do nothing more than punish lesbian and
gay families because they are different. An important part of this rhe-
torical move is to cast the tax as one not on same-sex couples, but rather
as one on lesbian and gay families. This focus on families both captures
the rhetoric of opponents of lesbian and gay rights and, at the same
time, reflects the reality that many same-sex couples do have children
living with them. By highlighting the impact of the DOMAs on the
children of same-sex couples and tapping into the general public's innate
revulsion toward taxes of all types, it may be possible to successfully shift
the rhetorical terrain of the debate over same-sex marriage (and, implic-
itly, the recognition of nontraditional family arrangements) to the
advantage of lesbian and gay rights advocates.'o
At another level, the importance of this inquiry lies in the addi-
tional restrictions that will be triggered if the DOMAs are classified as
taxes. In other words, this exploration may open additional avenues for
challenging the constitutionality of the DOMAs." As I discuss in Part
10. In this Article, I generally use the term "lesbian and gay rights advocates" broadly to
include not only lesbian and gay rights organizations, but also individuals who are
fighting to advance lesbian and gay rights. I intend the arguments here to be available
to, and to be used by, both groups. As I have discussed elsewhere, I am wary of rely-
ing solely on lesbian and gay rights organizations to advance this cause. See generally
Anthony C. Infanti, Homo Sacer, Homosexuab Some Thoughts on Waging Tax Guer-
rilla Warfare, 2 UNBOUND: HARV. J. OF THE LEGAL LEFr 27 (2006).
11. For a sampling of the more conventional grounds for mounting constitutional chal-
lenges to the federal DOMA, see Mark Strasser, Baker and Some Recipes for Disaster:
On DOMA, Covenant Marriages, and Full Faith and CreditJurisprudence, 64 BROOK.
L. REv. 307 (1998) (arguing that the Full Faith and Credit Clause and Due Process
Clause prohibit Congress from enacting DOMA); Mark Strasser, Ex Post Facto Laws,
Bills ofAttainder, and the Definition of Punishment: On DOM, the Hawaii Amend-
ment, and Federal Constitutional Constraints, 48 SYRACUSE L. REV. 227 (1998)
(arguing that DOMA violates the Bill of Attainder Clause); Mark Strasser, Loving the
Romer Out for Baehr: On Acts in Defense of Marriage and the Constitution, 58 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 279 (1997) (arguing that enactment of DOMA exceeds Congress's
power under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, violates the right to interstate travel,
and does not meet the relevant standard for displacing state domestic relations law);
Evan Wolfson & Michael F. Melcher, The Supreme Court's Decision in Romer v. Ev-
ans and Its Implications for the Defense of Marriage Act, 16 QUINNI PIAc L. REV. 217
(1996) (arguing that DOMA is unconstitutional on equal protection grounds be-
cause, out of antigay animus, Congress singled out lesbians and gay men for the
imposition of an inferior legal status; the same could, of course, be said for many, if
not all, state mini-DOMAs).
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III below, classifying the federal DOMA as a tax opens the way for a
challenge under the U.S. Constitution's direct tax clauses. Because the
federal DOMA operates much like a property tax on the legal rights and
obligations associated with same-sex couples' marriages, civil unions,
and domestic partnerships, it arguably qualifies as a "direct" tax and, as
such, can only pass constitutional muster if Congress has apportioned it
among the states by population (something Congress most assuredly has
not done). In addition, classifying the state mini-DOMAs as taxes opens
the way for challenges under the uniformity clauses found in many state
constitutions. As an example of how such a challenge might be framed, I
outline a potential challenge to the Arizona mini-DOMA under the
uniformity clause in that state's constitution.
At yet another level, I reach perhaps the most provocative question
raised by this line of inquiry; namely, whether one's sexual orientation
should be taken into account when determining the fairness of a tax-
here, the tax imposed by the DOMAs. This question takes on signal
importance in places where the constitutional challenges described in
the preceding paragraph are either unavailable or unsuccessful. In an-
swering this question at the end of Part III, I return to my earlier
discussion of the rhetorical importance of the reconceptualization of the
DOMAs as a tax to argue that a robust notion of tax equity must take
into account this additional tax on lesbian and gay families when assess-
ing the justness of the distribution of the overall tax burden. Just as in
that earlier discussion, this move helps to shift the rhetorical terrain in
important ways. Here, the rhetorical move shifts the debate away from a
focus on forcing states to recognize the right of same-sex couples to
marry-a framing of the question that generates reflexive opposition
among the many heterosexuals who are not yet ready to take this
stepl 2-and toward a discussion of whether it is fair to tax two similarly
12. Will Lester, Gay Marriage Issue Now Less Volatile, Poll Shows, Hous. CHRON., Mar.
26, 2006, at A8 (51% of Americans oppose same-sex marriage); USA To-
day/CNN/Gallup Poll: Where America Stands, USA TODAY, Feb. 24, 2004, at 6D
(53% of Americans oppose same-sex marriage); see Jesse McKinley, Backers of Gay
Marriage Rethink California Push, N.Y. TIMEs, July 27, 2009, at All (describing how
opponents of California's Proposition 8, see infra note 16, may delay their efforts to
place a new referendum on same-sex marriage on the California ballot until at least
2012 because they are "[d]iscouraged by stubborn poll numbers and pessimistic po-
litical consultants"); Cathleen Decker, By a Small Margin: Calfornia Voters Support
Same-Sex Marriage, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2009, at A5 (indicating that "[a] small ma-
jority of California voters supports the right of same-sex couples to marry, but by a
much larger margin, voters oppose efforts to place the issue back on the ballot next
year"). But see infra note 258 and accompanying text, which indicate that most
Americans do, however, favor affording at least some of the legal rights and obliga-
tions of marriage to same-sex couples.
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situated families differently-a framing of the question that is of more
general appeal because it is phrased in terms of the widely held belief
that those who are similarly situated should receive similar treatment
under the law. At the same time, this move enriches the debate over tax
fairness by shunning the typically unbending focus on the economic
dimension of individuals; instead, it pushes us to think about how an
individual's noneconomic characteristics (here, sexual orientation) might
be taken into account in assessing tax fairness.
To summarize, the remainder of this Article is divided into four
parts. In Part I, I explain the nature of the levy that the DOMAs impose
on same-sex couples. In Part II, I explain how this levy can be classified
as a "tax." In Part III, I discuss the federal- and state-level ramifications
of classifying the levy that the DOMAs impose as a "tax." Finally, I pro-
vide brief concluding remarks that discuss how this Article might pave
the way for making similar arguments with respect to other nontradi-
tional families and, concomitantly, how it demonstrates the
transformative potential of same-sex marriage.
I. THE NATURE OF THE LEVY
Before delving into the question of what makes something a tax, it
is necessary to spell out the precise nature of the levy that the federal
DOMA and the state mini-DOMAs impose on same-sex couples. To
this end, I will first describe the DOMAs and then use an example to
illustrate their effects on same-sex couples.
A. The DOMAs and the Pall of Uncertainty
The federal DOMA has two operative provisions. "One addresses
the treatment of same-sex marriages under federal law and the other ad-
dresses interstate recognition of same-sex marriages."" For purposes of
federal law, DOMA defines "marriage" to include "only a legal union
between one man and one woman as husband and wife."" With regard
to the interstate recognition of same-sex marriages, "DOMA allows each
state to refuse to give effect to the public acts, records, or judicial pro-
ceedings of 'any other State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a
relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a marriage
under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or tribe, or a
13. INFANTI, supra note 3, at 155.
14. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
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right or claim arising from such relationship."" Succinctly put, the fed-
eral DOMA refuses legal recognition to same-sex marriages for all
purposes of federal law and authorizes each state to similarly refuse legal
recognition to same-sex marriages celebrated outside of that state.
As of this writing, forty-one states have adopted some form of a
mini-DOMA: twelve states have a statutory prohibition against the rec-
ognition of same-sex marriages, three states have a constitutional
prohibition against the recognition of same-sex marriages, and twenty-
six states have both a statutory and a constitutional prohibition against
the recognition of same-sex marriages. In more than half of these
states, the mini-DOMA also refuses recognition to statuses that are simi-
lar to marriage (e.g., civil unions and domestic partnerships)."
The broad purpose and effect of the DOMAs is to limit the effect
of any one state's decision to extend all or a portion of the rights and
obligations of marriage to same-sex couples on both the federal
15. INFANTI, Supra note 3, at 155 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2007)).
16. Id. at 157 tbl.6.1. Since I compiled this table, the California Supreme Court struck
down that state's statutory prohibition against same-sex marriage, In re Marriage
Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008), but California voters quickly replaced the statutory
prohibition with a constitutional one (so-called Proposition 8), CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 7.5; see Jesse McKinley & Laurie Goodstein, Bans in 3 States on Gay Marriage, N.Y.
TIMEs, Nov. 6, 2008, at Al. The California Supreme Court turned away a constitu-
tional challenge to Proposition 8, but held that same-sex marriages celebrated in
California prior to the passage of Proposition 8 must continue to be legally recog-
nized. Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48 (Cal. 2009). In November 2008, both Florida
and Arizona added constitutional prohibitions against same-sex marriage to their ex-
isting statutory prohibitions. McKinley & Goodstein, supra. The Connecticut
Supreme Court, however, effectively struck down that state's statutory prohibition
against same-sex marriage when it extended the right to marry to same-sex couples.
See Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407 (Conn. 2008). The Iowa Su-
preme Court did likewise when it extended the right to marry to same-sex couples.
Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009). The legislatures of Maine, New
Hampshire, and Vermont all eliminated their states' statutory prohibitions against
same-sex marriage when they approved legislation extending the right to marry to
same-sex couples. Act of May 6, 2009, 2009 Me. ALS 82 (LexisNexis); Act of June 3,
2009, 2009 NH ALS 59 (LexisNexis); Act of Apr. 7, 2009, 2009 Vt. ALS 3 (Lex-
isNexis). Same-sex marriages began to be performed in Vermont on September 1,
2009, and will begin to be performed in New Hampshire on January 1, 2010. Op-
ponents of same-sex marriage in Maine immediately filed the necessary paperwork to
put its new same-sex marriage law before the voters in a "people's referendum." Judy
Harrison, Anti-Gay Marriage Effort Advances, BANGOR DAILY NEWS, May 20, 2009,
at Al. On November 3, 2009, voters in Maine repealed this legislation before it ever
went into effect. Abby Goodnough, Gay Rights Rebuke May Result in a Change in
Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2009, at A25.
17. INFANTI, supra note 3, at 157 tbl.6.1; see also supra note 16.
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government and other states." Fifteen states and the District of Colum-
bia have taken steps to extend all or a portion of the rights and obligations
of marriage to same-sex couples. As of this writing, Connecticut, Iowa,
Massachusetts, and Vermont are the only states that allow their residents
to enter into same-sex marriages." California, New Hampshire, New Jer-
sey, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington allow same-sex couples to enter
into relationships-whether denominated "domestic partnerships" or
"civil unions"-that are the legal equivalent of marriage.20 Notable among
these states is New Hampshire, which is set to begin allowing its residents
to enter into same-sex marriages on January 1, 2010.21 Colorado, the Dis-
trict of Columbia, Hawaii, Maine, and Wisconsin all permit same-sex
couples "to enter into legal relationships that fall short (in some cases, far
short) of marriage."2 2 Maryland similarly affords limited recognition to
18. See H.R. REP. No. 104-664, supra note 4, at 2, 6-7, 10, 17-18 (describing how the
federal DOMA was intended to limit the effect on both the federal government and
other states of the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision in Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44
(Haw. 1993), which raised the specter of legalized same-sex marriage for the first
time).
19. Act of Apr. 7, 2009, 2009 Vt. ALS 3 (LexisNexis); Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 482; Var-
num, 763 N.W.2d at 907; Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565,
569 (Mass. 2004); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955-57
(Mass. 2003).
20. CAL. FAm. CODE %§ 297, 297.5 (2008); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 457-A:1-6 (2008);
N.J. REV. STAT. § 37:1-31 (2008); Act of May 31, 2009, 2009 Nev. ALS 393 (Lex-
isNexis) (effective Oct. 1, 2009); Act of May 9, 2007, 2007 Ore. ALS 99 (LexisNexis),
as amended by Act of June 25, 2009, 2009 Ore. HB 2389 (LexisNexis); Ryan Blethen,
Referendum 71 Shows Washington's Strategy for Marriage Equality Is Working, SEATTLE
TIMEs, Nov. 6, 2009, available at http://seatletimes.nwsource.com/htmllopinion/
2010219375_ryanO8.htm.
For a short few months, California did recognize same-sex marriage. Same-sex
couples began to marry in the state following a decision of the California Supreme
Court extending the right to marry to them. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384
(Cal. 2008). As mentioned above, see supra note 16, the voters of California reversed
that decision in November 2008 when they approved Proposition 8 and amended the
state's constitution to ban same-sex marriage. The California Supreme Court turned
away a constitutional challenge to Proposition 8, but decided that the marriages of
those same-sex couples who married in the window between the court decision and
the election will continue to be recognized. See supra note 16.
21. Act of June 3, 2009, 2009 NH ALS 59 (LexisNexis).
22. INFANTI, supra note 3, at 158; Stacy Forster, Wisconsin to Offer Rights to Gay Couples,
MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL, July 2, 2009, at B (indicating that "same-sex cou-
ples would be offered 43 of the more than 200 rights and benefits extended to
married couples"); John Ingold, Legislature 2009 Law Eases Estate Planning for Unwed
and Gay Couples, DENVER PosT, Apr. 10, 2009, at B1 (describing a new law that "al-
lows two people to enter into 'designated beneficiary agreements' for estate planning,
property purchases, medical decisions and certain benefits such as life-insurance and
retirement-plan disbursements").
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same-sex relationships, but it has not established a domestic partnership
registry as such; rather, it has merely enacted a definition of "domestic
partnership" and a list of the types of proof that domestic partners "may
be required to provide" regarding the existence of their relationship.23
The DOMAs are meant to curtail the impact of these advances
and, as we will explore further below, have thus far been remarkably suc-
cessful in doing so. 24 But even among this group of jurisdictions that
legally recognize same-sex relationships, there is considerable uncertainty
surrounding the portability of the various legal statuses. In many of
these jurisdictions, legal recognition of same-sex relationships coexists
with a statutory or constitutional mini-DOMA, giving rise to confu-
sion. For instance, California, Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington all have
adopted some form of a mini-DOMA. 25 Although the District of Co-
lumbia and New Jersey have not adopted either an express statutory or
constitutional prohibition against same-sex marriage, their courts have
interpreted their ambiguous statutes to prohibit same-sex marriage. 26
Nevertheless, in July 2009, legislation took effect in the District of Co-
lumbia that requires recognition of same-sex marriages celebrated
elsewhere. 27 Among the handful of jurisdictions that neither have a
mini-DOMA nor themselves sanction same-sex marriage or a legally
equivalent relationship, the courts of New York and Rhode Island have
21interpreted their ambiguous statutes to prohibit same-sex marriage.
It is not entirely clear whether, or precisely to what extent, many
of these jurisdictions will recognize same-sex marriages or legally
equivalent relationships celebrated in other states. For example, under
New Hampshire's new law recognizing same-sex marriages, New Hamp-
shire will treat same-sex marriages and civil unions contracted in other
states as a New Hampshire marriage, but the law makes no mention of
whether it will recognize other legally equivalent same-sex relationships
(e.g., domestic partnerships).2 9 In addition, California will recognize
23. MD. CODE. ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 6-101 (LexisNexis 2009).
24. On occasion, a same-sex couple has been successful in legally dissolving their relation-
ship in a state that otherwise refuses to legally recognize same-sex relationships;
however, "there are only a few published decisions in this area, and those decisions
provide evidence of only mixed success." INFANTI, supra note 3, at 182.
25. Id. at 157 tbl.6.1; see supra note 16.
26. INFANTI, supra note 3, at 157 tbl.6.1.
27. Nikita Stewart, How Gay Marriage Recognition Works, WASH. PosT, July 7, 2009, at
B2.
28. INFANTI, supra note 3, at 157 tbl.6.1 (citing a decision from New York); Chambers v.
Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007) (interpreting the statute conferring jurisdiction
over divorces on the state's family courts).
29. Act of June 3, 2009, 2009 NH ALS 59 (LexisNexis).
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legal statuses equivalent to a California domestic partnership, but gener-
ally refuses to recognize same-sex marriages as such.o A recently enacted
law does, however, require California to recognize out-of-state same-sex
marriages entered into prior to the passage of Proposition 8, and it af-
fords same-sex couples married out of state on or after the passage of
Proposition 8 all of the rights and obligations of marriage-though it
does not accord them the legal status of "marriage."31
The New Jersey attorney general has opined that same-sex mar-
riages, civil unions, and domestic partnerships entered into in other
states will be recognized in New Jersey, either as a civil union (if it is the
equivalent of a New Jersey civil union, which affords all of the rights
and obligations of marriage to same-sex couples) or as a domestic part-
nership (if it is the equivalent of a New Jersey domestic partnership,
which affords something less than all of the rights and obligations of
marriage to same-sex couples).32 Yet, despite a favorable opinion from
the New York attorney general, the New York courts have issued mixed
decisions on this question. In 2008, the governor of New York issued
an order directing state agencies to recognize same-sex marriages cele-
brated in other jurisdictions.3 ' However, this order has no effect on the
mixed signals that have been sent by the state courts, and, even with
respect to state agencies, its validity has been cast in doubt by several
30. See supra note 16.
31. An Act to Amend Section 308 of the Family Code, 2009 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 625
(S.B. 54) (West).
32. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 3-2007, 2007 N.J. AG LEXIS 2 (Feb. 16, 2007).
33. Compare Lewis v. N.Y. Dep't of Civil Servs., No. 4078-07, 2009 WL 137504 (N.Y.
App. Div. Jan. 22, 2009) (rejecting a challenge to the state's extension of health in-
surance benefits to the spouses of lesbian and gay state employees who are parties to a
same-sex marriage entered into in another state), and Martinez v. County of Monroe,
850 N.Y.S.2d 740 (App. Div. 2008) (requiring recognition of a Canadian same-sex
marriage), and C.M. v. C.C., 867 N.Y.S.2d 884 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (same), and Beth R.
v. Donna M., 853 N.Y.S.2d 501 (Sup. Ct. 2008) (same), with Matter of Langan v.
State Farm Fire & Cas., 849 N.Y.S.2d 105 (App. Div. 2007) (refusing recognition to
a Vermont civil union), and Langan v. St. Vincent's Hosp., 802 N.Y.S.2d 476 (App.
Div. 2005) (same), and Gonzalez v. Green, 831 N.Y.S.2d 856 (Sup. Ct. 2006) (re-
fusing recognition to a Canadian same-sex marriage), and Funderburke v. N.Y. State
Dep't of Civil Serv., 822 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Sup. Ct. 2006), vacated, 854 N.Y.S.2d 466
(App. Div. 2008) (same), and Will of Alan Zwerling, 2008 N.Y. Misc. LEXIS 5651,
at *1 (Sur. Ct. Sept. 9, 2008) (recognizing a Canadian same-sex marriage for pur-
poses of an intestacy proceeding, but joining the deceased's parents as parties to the
proceeding-even though they would not normally be so joined where there is a sur-
viving spouse-because the state of the law on recognizing out-of-state same-sex
marriages in the Second Department of the Appellate Division of the New York Su-
preme Court is unclear).
34. Jeremy W. Peters, New York to Back Same-Sex Unions from Elewhere, N.Y. TmES,
May 29, 2008, at Al.
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state legislators and the Alliance Defense Fund, who have together filed
a lawsuit challenging the governor's actions on constitutional grounds."
The message from the New York courts has been sufficiently muddled
that the New York Court of Appeals, the state's highest court, granted
leave to appeal in two cases that concern the recognition of out-of-state
same-sex marriages.36 Nevertheless, the court ultimately dodged the
question of whether the State of New York must recognize same-sex
marriages celebrated in other jurisdictions, instead deciding the case on
technical and procedural grounds." In the same muddled vein, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court contradicted the opinion of the Rhode
Island attorney general when it refused to allow a same-sex couple mar-
ried in Massachusetts access to the state's courts for purposes of
obtaining a divorce, concluding that the word "marriage" in the jurisdic-
tional statute for the Rhode Island family courts embraces only the
marriages of different-sex couples.38
Some of the states that either legally recognize same-sex relation-
ships or do not expressly prohibit them have not yet indicated whether
they will recognize legal relationships entered into in other jurisdictions.
This only adds to the uncertainty and confusion surrounding the port-
ability of same-sex marriages, civil unions, and domestic partnerships.39
Due to the sheer number of states that unequivocally prohibit the
recognition of same-sex marriages (and, often, legally equivalent rela-
tionships, too) and the significant uncertainty that surrounds the
portability of legal status even among jurisdictions that are not un-
equivocally opposed to recognizing same-sex relationships, same-sex
couples who enter into marriages, civil unions, or domestic partnerships
"are forced to act as if the legal recognition of their relationships does
. n40
not exist.
35. Jeremy W. Peters, Suit Seeks to Block State Policy on Same-Sex Unions, N.Y. TIMES,
June 4, 2008, at B3. The New York Supreme Court, which is a trial-level court, dis-
missed the suit, but the plaintiffs immediately indicated their intent to appeal the
ruling. Nicholas Confessore, Court Backs Paterson Regarding Gay Unions, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 2, 2008, at B5.
36. Godfrey v. Spano, 906 N.E.2d 1085 (N.Y. 2009); Lewis v. N.Y. State Dep't of Civil
Serv., 906 N.E.2d 1086 (N.Y. 2009).
37. Godfrey v. Spano, No. 147, 2009 N.Y. LEXIS 4050 (Nov. 19, 2009).
38. Chambers v. Ormiston, 935 A.2d 956 (R.I. 2007); Op. Att'y Gen. (Feb. 20, 2007),
available at http://www.glad.org/News Room/RlAttorneyGeneralStatement.pdf.
39. See infia note 49 and accompanying text.
40. INFANT, supra note 3, at 158.
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B. Gauging the Impact of the DOMAs and the Pall of Uncertainty
To better understand the practical impact of the federal DOMA
and state mini-DOMAs on same-sex couples, let us compare and con-
trast the treatment of two families: one headed by a different-sex
married couple and one headed by a same-sex married couple, both
couples having been married in Boston, Massachusetts. From the per-
spective of the State of Massachusetts, both of these couples are in
identical situations. Each couple paid the same amount (i.e., fifty dol-
lars) for its marriage license." Once married, both couples are subject to
the same legal obligations and have the same legal rights under Massa-
chusetts law.42
Yet these two couples' legal relationships are relevant not only for
purposes of Massachusetts law, but also for purposes of federal law and
the laws of other states. According to the General Accounting Office, as
of December 31, 2003, there were at least 1,138 federal statutory provi-
sions "in which marital status is a factor in determining or receiving
benefits, rights, and privileges."4 It will, therefore, be the rare couple
that is able to avoid dealings with the federal government that somehow
implicate their marital status. It will also be the rare couple that never
travels to (or through) another state; that never enters into a transaction
with a party in another state; that never owns or rents property in an-
other state; and that never has any other sort of dealing with a person,
entity, or property located in another state that might somehow impli-
cate their marital status. Thus, it is important to consider how both the
federal government and other states will view these two couples' mar-
riages.
From that perspective, the two couples are in radically different posi-
tions. On the one hand, the federal government, the other states, and the
District of Columbia will recognize the different-sex couple's Massachu-
setts marriage as a matter of course.44 In other words, the different-sex
couple would not need to reapply for a marriage license anywhere, draft
any special documents, or undertake any special judicial proceedings to
41. City of Boston, Marriage Intention Instructions, http://www.cityofboston.gov/registry/
marriage.asp (last visited Nov. 7, 2009).
42. Opinions of the Justices to the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Mass. 2004); Good-
ridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955-57 (Mass. 2003).
43. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE AcT: UPDATE TO PRIOR
REPORT, GAO-04-253R (Jan. 23, 2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
d04353r.pdf.
44. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 283-84 (1971); cf 1 U.S.C. § 7
(2008); 28 id. § 1738C (concerning the refusal to, or ability to refuse to, recognize
same-sex marriages).
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ensure the legal recognition of both their spousal relationship and their
parental relationship with any children that they might have together.
On the other hand, the same-sex couple's Massachusetts marriage
will not be so easily recognized." In the other jurisdictions that legally
recognize same-sex relationships and in those jurisdictions that do not
have explicit statutory or constitutional prohibitions against the recogni-
tion of same-sex marriages, the same-sex couple's marriage may-or may
not-be legally recognized." For example, the couple's marriage will not
be recognized in Nevada, even though Nevada recognizes other same-sex
legal unions. In contrast, it seems that New Jersey will recognize the
couple's marriage as a civil union. But the treatment of the couple's
marriage in Oregon is less clear given the silence of that state's domestic
partnership law on this question and the existence of a constitutional
mini-DOMA in Oregon. In the face of such uncertainty, an Oregon
lesbian and gay rights organization has advised same-sex couples in this
position that the "safest route" to legal recognition of their relationship
in Oregon is to enter into a domestic partnership there-in addition to
their extant marriage.o In contrast, the remaining states and the federal
government have, through the enactment of their DOMAs, taken af-
firmative steps to ensure that the same-sex couple's Massachusetts
marriage will not be legally recognized. Notwithstanding the seeming
inflexibility of the federal DOMA and the state mini-DOMAs, however,
both the federal government and these states will, under certain circum-
stances, tacitly recognize the same-sex couple's spousal relationship as
well as their parental relationship with their children. This same tacit
recognition is possible in states that do not explicitly prohibit same-sex
marriage and in states that recognize some same-sex relationships but
refuse recognition to others.
45. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2008); INFANTI, supra note 3, at 166 nn.120-2
2 .
46. See supra notes 25-38 and accompanying text.
47. Act of May 31, 2009, § 10, 2009 Nev. ALS 393 (LexisNexis) (effective Oct. 1,
2009).
48. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
49. Act of May 9, 2007, 2007 Ore. ALS 99 (LexisNexis), as amended by Act of June 25,
2009, 2009 Ore. HB 2389 (LexisNexis).
50. BASIC RIGHTS OREGON, DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP RESOURCE GUIDE (2008), available
at http://www.basicrights.org/comm..doc/doc.pdf. Similarly, before the right to
marry was extended to same-sex couples in Connecticut, that state's attorney general
opined that Massachusetts same-sex marriages would not be recognized in Connecti-
cut. The attorney general further indicated that, to have their relationship legally
recognized, a married Massachusetts same-sex couple would have to travel to Con-
necticut and separately enter into a civil union there. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 2005-024,
2005 Conn. AG LEXIS 23.
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That tacit recognition will, of course, not be based on the same-sex
couple's marriage. Rather, to have their spousal relationship recognized,
the same-sex couple will need to engage a lawyer to draft a ream of
documents, including wills, living trusts, powers of attorney, hospital
visitation authorizations, and a domestic partnership agreement." These
documents attempt52 to ensure that both members of the couple are
provided for in the event of the death of one of them, that the members
of the couple can make medical and financial decisions on behalf of
each other and visit each other when hospitalized, and that the parame-
ters of their relationship (including the extent to which financial
resources will be pooled, household obligations will be discharged, sup-
port payments will be made upon the dissolution of the relationship,
and disputes will be resolved) have been established.53 In addition, if one
or both spouses changed their surnames on the marriage certificate, 4
then the federal government may not recognize that name change unless
the couple also incurs the expense of going to court to obtain a judicial
decree changing the surname(s) of the relevant spouse(s)."
If the couple has children (as so many same-sex couples now do),
that will entail further planning. If the children are adopted by one or
both parents, it would still be wise for them to have their lawyer draft a
shared parenting agreement and powers of attorney in case questions
arise-as they already have-about whether adoptions by same-sex cou-
51. INFANI, supra note 3, at ch. 7. Naturally, not every couple will draft precisely the
same set of documents or cover precisely the same ground in attempting to backstop
the legal recognition of their relationship. This results from the couple's ability to
choose from among an " la carte" menu of the rights and obligations of marriage,
civil unions, and domestic partnerships when drafting these documents. (Thanks go
to Neil Buchanan both for this point and for this terminology.) This ability to choose
does not, however, affect the fact of the DOMAs being a tax; it merely affects the
amount of the tax that is paid. See infra Part II.B.
52. I would like to underscore my careful choice of the word "attempt" here. For even if
a couple undertakes its best efforts to re-create the legal rights and obligations of mar-
riage ostensibly abrogated by the DOMAs, there is no guarantee that the resulting
documents will actually be respected. See, e.g., INFANT, supra note 3, at 174, 178-81
(describing how advance directives are sometimes not honored and how wills, living
trusts, and even joint tenancies may be subject to attack).
53. Id. at ch. 7.
54. MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 46, § 1D (2008) ("Each party to a marriage may adopt any
surname, including but not limited to the present or birth-given surname of either
party, may retain or resume use of a present or birth-given surname, or may adopt
any hyphenated combination thereof.").
55. See infra notes 101-102 and accompanying text .
56. See infra text accompanying note 92.
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ples must be recognized by other states. 7 In the case of children conceived
through intrauterine insemination, lesbian couples cannot simply rely
upon a statutory presumption of parentage" to create a legal parent-child
relationship between the nonbiological mother and the child." The cou-
ple may wish to have the nonbiological mother adopt the child and to
draft a shared parenting agreement as a backup to that adoption.o In the
case of children from previous relationships, adoption, shared parenting
agreements, and/or powers of attorney would be necessary to have the
61
stepparent relationship legally recognized.
57. INFANTI, Supra note 3, at 222 (discussing an unsuccessful attempt by the State of
Oklahoma and an ongoing attempt by the State of Louisiana to refuse recognition to
adoptions by same-sex couples). The federal district court ruled in favor of the adopt-
ing parents in the Louisiana case, but the state has appealed that decision and the case
is currently pending before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. Bill Bar-
row, House Votes to Restrict Revised Birth Certificates, TIMES-PICAYUNE, May 13,
2009, at 4. Thumbing its collective nose at the federal district court's decision, the
Louisiana House of Representatives passed a bill that would prohibit birth certificates
from being revised to show the names of two adoptive parents who are unmarried. Id.
That bill died in the Louisiana Senate. La. State Legislature, Final Disposition of
House Bills: 2009 Regular Legislative Session, http://www.legis.state.la.us/ (click on
"Resum6 from the 2009 Regular Legislative Session"; then click on "Final Disposi-
tion of House Bills"; reporting that House Bill 60 died on the Senate calendar) (last
visited Nov. 7, 2009).
58. MAsS. GEN. LAws ch. 46, § 4B (2008) ("Any child born to a married woman as a
result of artificial insemination with the consent of her husband, shall be considered
the legitimate child of the mother and such husband."); Opinions of the Justices to
the Senate, 802 N.E.2d 565, 569 (Mass. 2004); Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health,
798 N.E.2d 941, 955-57 (Mass. 2003).
59. See, e.g., INFANTI, supra note 3, at 220, 222-23 (describing the possible application of
presumptions of parentage to lesbian couples and the cloud of uncertainty that sur-
rounds the question of whether these presumptions will be honored by other states);
Patricia A. Cain, Federal Tax Consequences ofCivil Unions, 30 CAP. U. L. REv. 387, 394
(2002) (indicating that same-sex couples who enter into civil unions in Vermont would
"probably be advised to go through an adoption to resolve the question of whether the
nonbiological parent is a parent under Vermont law [i.e., the presumption of parent-
age]"; in fact, in a recent case, the Vermont Supreme Court narrowly construed the
state's presumption of parentage "to apply only for purposes of child support actions.
Nonetheless, the court has indicated that, at least in the context of a visitation proceed-
ing, a lesbian 'couple's legal union [i.e., civil union] at the time of the child's birth is
extremely persuasive evidence of joint parentage."' INFANTS, supra note 3, at 233 n. 157
(quoting Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 2006 VT 78, 158 (2006)).
60. INFANTI, supra note 3, at 221-23.
61. See, e.g., MASs. GEN. LAws ch. 201A, § 1 (2008) (for purposes of the Transfers to
Minors Act, defining "members of the minor's family" to include, among others, a
stepparent); see also Cain, supra note 59, at 396-99 (discussing the uncertainty sur-
rounding the recognition for federal tax purposes of stepparent relationships created
by Vermont's civil union law).
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The bottom line here is that the federal government and the states
with mini-DOMAs-as well as the handful of states that do not explic-
itly prohibit the recognition of same-sex marriages-will recognize the
62Massachusetts same-sex couple's relationship in some circumstances.
But that recognition comes at a price: the cost of drafting numerous
documents and undertaking various legal proceedings to duplicate legal
rights and obligations that the different-sex couple takes for granted and
that the same-sex couple should already have.63 It is important to ac-
knowledge here that not all same-sex couples will be able to afford to
pay some or all of the price of tacit recognition of their relationship,
with the result being forfeiture of the relevant legal protections when
they cross state lines or deal with the federal government.
II. A TAX ON LESBIAN AND GAY FAMILIES
The question of what precisely qualifies something as a tax is not
routinely asked in the tax literature. By and large, we do not ask the
question because the answer apE ears self-evident. For example, who,
aside from the stray tax protester, would seriously argue that our extant
federal income tax is not a tax?65 Similarly, who would argue that a con-
62. Again, to underscore and explain this caveat: Even the most diligent couple can never
precisely duplicate all of the legal rights and obligations of marriage through the exe-
cution of legal documents and undertaking of legal proceedings. There are certain
rights and obligations of marriage that only the state itself can grant (e.g., exemptions
from taxation for transfers between spouses and immunity from being called to testify
against a spouse).
63. It is worth noting, however, that Virginia and Montana have mini-DOMAs written
so broadly as to cast doubt on whether they will recognize the validity of these docu-
ments. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-1-401(4) (2007) ("A contractual relationship
entered into for the purpose of achieving a civil relationship that is prohibited under
subsection (1) [which includes same-sex marriage] is void as against public policy.");
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-45.3 (2007) ("A civil union, partnership contract or other ar-
rangement between persons of the same sex purporting to bestow the privileges or
obligations of marriage is prohibited.").
64. Ball v. United States, 94-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 50,149 (C.D.Ill. 1994) ("Plain-
tiff, however, argues that the federal income tax is not a 'tax,' and, therefore, 26
U.S.C. § 74 2 1(a) does not apply to bar his request for injunction."). This does not,
however, appear to be an argument that tax protesters commonly make, as indicated
by its noticeable absence from the Internal Revenue Service's annual publication de-
bunking frivolous tax arguments. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., THE TRUTH ABOUT
FRIVOLOUS TAX ARGUMENTS (2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/taxpros/article/
0,,id= 1 59853,00.html.
65. In Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916), the U.S. Supreme
Court addressed a whole host of attacks upon the constitutionality of the Revenue
Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II, 38 Stat. 114, 166, which was the first income tax law
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sumption tax (were one enacted as a replacement for, or supplement to,
our current federal income tax) is not a tax?66
The question of what is a tax only gets asked at the margins-usually
when there is a question about the extent of a government's revenue rais-
ing power. For example, there are sometimes questions at the state and
local level about whether a given levy should be classified as a "tax" or a
"fee," because the nature of the classification triggers different restrictions
on the government's authority to impose the levy. At the federal level,
similar questions about the difference between a "tax" and a "fee" have
arisen in (1) probing the boundaries of intergovernmental tax immunity,
enacted after the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment. Notably, none of the nu-
merous grounds for attack-all of which the Court rejected-in any way concerned
whether the Revenue Act of 1913 levied a "tax" within the meaning of the provisions
in the U.S. Constitution that grant Congress the power to impose an income tax
without apportionment among the several states. See U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; id.
amend. XVI.
66. In fact, the constitutional controversy surrounding consumption taxes does not con-
cern whether they are "taxes," but whether they are "taxes on income" within the
meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment. This is important because, as discussed more
fully injra Part III.A, the Constitution requires all direct taxes-other than taxes on
income-to be apportioned based on population. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3; id.
art. I, § 9, cl. 4. Thus, deciding whether consumption taxes that qualify as direct
taxes (e.g., the Hall-Rabushka flat tax, see Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, the Six-
teenth Amendment, and the Meaning of "Incomes," 33 ARz. ST. L.J. 1057, 1063
(2001) [hereinafter Jensen, Meaning of "Incomes']) are "taxes on income" will likely
determine their (un)constitutionality. Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of "Direct
Taxes": Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2334, 2404
(1997) [hereinafter Jensen, Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional.il. This issue has en-
gendered significant debate among a small group of academic commentators.
Compare Jensen, Meaning of "Incomes, "supra (arguing that certain consumption taxes
are subject to the constitutional requirement of apportionment based on population),
and Jensen, Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, supra (same), with Lawrence Ze-
lenak, Radical Tax Reform, the Constitution, and the Conscientious Legislator, 99
COLUM. L. REv. 833 (1999) (arguing that legislators could reasonably conclude that
these same consumption taxes are either not direct taxes or, even if they are, that they
are "taxes on income" within the meaning of the Sixteenth Amendment; in either
case, they will be exempt from the constitutional requirement of apportionment
based on population). See also infra Part III.A.
67. See, e.g., Hugh D. Spitzer, Taxes vs. Fees: A Curious Confision, 38 GONz. L. REV. 335
(2002-2003); see also Joshua Michrom, Note, Making Prisoners Pay for Their Stay:
How a Popular Correctional Program Violates the Ex Post Facto Clause, 13 B.U. Pus.
INT. L.J. 187, 200 n.91 (2004) (noting that pay-to-stay prison programs created by
the executive branch may be vulnerable to attack in some states as a usurpation of the
legislature's right to tax).
68. See John Michael Chamberlain, State Regulation of Federal Dredging Projects: Sover-
eign Immunity and the Issue of Reasonable Fees, 3 HASTINGS W.-Nw. J. ENvrt. L. &
POL'Y 165, 173-77 (1995) (construing the federal government's waiver of sovereign
immunity with respect to the payment of "reasonable state water quality fees incurred
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(2) applying the Tax Injunction Act, (3) determining whether Congress
has effected an unconstitutional delegation of its taxing power to a fed-
eral agency,70 and (4) determining whether Congress has exceeded its
71constitutional authority by imposing a tax on exports.
But we are not concerned here with nice differences between taxes
and fees.72 Instead, we are concerned with the more novel question of
whether legislation that does not purport to impose either a tax or a
fee-and that is not even conventionally thought of as imposing any
type of levy at all-can be classified as a "tax."73
in the course of dredging projects" and relying on case law making the distinction be-
tween "taxes" and "fees" to do so).
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (2008); see Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Reconsidering the Nondelegation
Doctrine: Universal Service, the Power to Tax, and the Ratification Doctrine, 80 IND.
L.J. 239, 270-71 (2005); Robert F. Williams, The Tax Injunction Act and Judicial Re-
straint: Property Tax Litigation in Federal Courts, 12 RUTGERS L.J. 653, 676 (198 1).
70. See Clayton P. Gillette & Thomas D. Hopkins, Federal User Fees: A Legal and Eco-
nomic Analysis, 67 B.U. L. REV. 795, 822-24 (1987). But cf Krotoszynski, supra note
69, at 268-77 (arguing that the tax/fee distinction has become moot).
71. See Krotoszynski, supra note 69, at 271-72.
72. Indeed, a common refrain in articles discussing this distinction is that it is one that
can be exceedingly difficult to draw. See, e.g., Chamberlain, supra note 68, at 173
("Much case law has developed surrounding the distinction between a 'fee' and a
,tax.' While the question has been approached from divergent angles yielding equally
divergent outcomes, some general guiding principles can be extracted."); Spitzer, su-
pra note 67, at 336 ("Unfortunately, Washington case law concerning the distinction
between taxes and fees has been murky and confusing, primarily because the courts
often resort to a simplistic dichotomy between taxes and regulatory fees.").
A "classic tax" is a charge imposed by a legislative body upon a large por-
tion of society in order to raise revenues that will benefit society at large.
By way of contrast, a "classic fee" is a charge that an administrative agency
imposes upon persons or entities that are subject to its regulation. The fee
may serve a direct regulatory purpose or a more indirect purpose such as
raising money for a specific account to help fund the agency's expenses.
Unfortunately, few charges fall directly into one of these categories.
Krotoszynski, supra note 69, at 271 (footnotes omitted); see also Richard A. Chesley,
Note, The Current Use of the Initiative and Referendum in Ohio and Other States, 53
U. CIN. L. REv. 541, 557 (1984) ("[T]he courts in Ohio have had trouble in deline-
ating the term 'tax levy' . . . .").
73. This Article is part of a larger project that seeks to question and problematize distinc-
tions and concepts in the tax policy literature that, on their face, seem normal,
natural, or incontestable. See Anthony C. Infanti, A Tax Crit Identity Crisis? Or Tax
Expenditure Analysis, Deconstruction, and the Rethinking of a Collective Identity, 26
WHITTIER L. REV. 707 (2005) [hereinafter Infanti, A Tax Crit Identity Crisis.1 (high-
lighting the artificiality of the mainstream/marginal distinction in the tax policy
literature and drawing attention to the ways in which that distinction can be em-
ployed to ignore or discredit critical contributions to that literature); Anthony C.
Infanti, Deconstructing the Duty to the Tax System: Unfettering Zealous Advocacy on
Behalfof Lesbian and Gay Taxpayers, 61 TAx LAw. 405 (2008) [hereinafter Infanti,
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So, what makes something a tax? Clearly, it cannot simply be the
label that is-or is not-attached to something that makes it a tax. To
allow the label to dictate the classification of something as a tax would
contravene the oft-repeated maxim that tax is an area concerned with
substance rather than form. Indeed, the federal government itself re-
fuses to treat a foreign levy as a tax for foreign tax credit purposes simply
because the foreign country calls it a tax." Accordingly, the fact that nei-
ther Congress nor any of the states refers to its respective "defense of
marriage" act as a "tax" should have no effect on whether the DOMAs
are actually taxes.
But, if the label does not matter, then what is it that we should be
looking for when determining whether the federal DOMA and state
Deconstructing the Duty to the Tax System] (turning the conventional conceptualiza-
tion of the tax lawyer's duty to the tax system on its head by demonstrating that, in
the representation of lesbian and gay clients, the duty actually unfetters-rather than
constrains-the tax lawyer's zealous advocacy on behalf of her clients); Anthony C.
Infanti, Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REv. 1191 (2008) [hereinafter Infanti, Tax Equity]
(exploring how the core tax policy concept of equity can have negative effects on the
contributions of critical tax scholars to the tax policy literature).
74. See, e.g., United States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 367 (1998) ("However, 'we
must regard things rather than names' in determining whether an imposition on ex-
ports ranks as a tax. The crucial question is whether the HMT is a tax on exports in
operation as well as nomenclature or whether, despite the label Congress has put on
it, the exaction is instead a bona fide user fee." (quoting Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372,
376 (1876)) (citation omitted)); State v. Medeiros, 973 P.2d 736, 741 (Haw. 1999)
("ROCCH § 6-52.2 self-characterizes its charge against convicted persons as a 'fee.'
However, 'the nature of the tax [or "charge"] that a law imposes is not determined by
the label given to it but by its operating incidence.'" (quoting Stewarts' Pharmacies,
Ltd. v. Fase, 43 Haw. 131, 144 (1959) (citation omitted))); City of Huntington v.
Bacon, 473 S.E.2d 743, 752 (W. Va. 1996) ("Though the above language employed
by the legislature in W. Va. Code, 8-13-13 [1971] suggests that the legislature in-
tended the charges imposed on the users of essential or special municipal services to
be user fees rather than taxes, this Court has held 'the character of a tax is determined
not by its label but by analyzing its operation and effect'" (quoting City of Fairmont v.
Pitrolo Pontiac-Cadillac, 308 S.E.2d 527 (W. Va. 1983)); cf Emerson Coll. v. Bos-
ton, 462 N.E.2d 1098, 1104-05 (Mass. 1984) ("In reviewing the statute, we are
bound, as was the judge, to treat with deference the classification of the charge as a
fee. 'In any doubtful case, the intention of the Legislature, as it may be expressed in
part through its characterization [of the charge] . . . deserves judicial respect, and es-
pecially so where the constitutionality of the exaction depends on its proper
characterization' (footnote omitted). Associated Indus. of Mass., Inc. v. Commis-
sioner of Revenue, 378 Mass. 657, 667-68 (1979) . ... Ultimately, however, the
nature of a monetary exaction 'must be determined by its operation rather than its
specially descriptive phrase.' Thomson Elec. Welding Co. v. Commonwealth, 275
Mass. 426, 429 (1931).").
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(a)(2)(i) (as amended in 1991) ("Therefore, the assertion by a
foreign country that a levy is pursuant to the foreign country's authority to levy taxes
is not determinative that, under U.S. principles, it is pursuant thereto.").
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mini-DOMAs are taxes? In common usage, the word "tax" has two dif-
ferent meanings-one technical and the other figurative. In its technical
sense, the noun "tax' is defined as "[a] compulsory contribution to the
support of government, levied on persons, property, income, commodi-
,,76ties, transactions, etc.... In its figurative sense, the word "tax" is
defined as "[slomething compared to a tax in its incidence, obligation,
or burdensomeness; an oppressive or burdensome charge, obligation, or
duty; a burden, strain, heavy demand."n I will address this latter sense
first in order to lay the groundwork, which I will build on in the follow-
ing section, for distinguishing this project somewhat (but only
somewhat) from more purely rhetorical uses of the word "tax."
A. Figuratively Speaking
It is not uncommon to see the additional burdens imposed on tra-
ditionally subordinated groups in our society likened to taxes. Jody
Armour's description of the "Black Tax" provides a nice example of the
way that the word "tax" can be used to effectively communicate the na-
ture and impact of such burdens on a minority group:
The Black Tax is the price Black people pay in their encoun-
ters with Whites (and some Blacks) because of Black
stereotypes. The concept of a "tax" captures several key charac-
teristics of these stereotype-laden encounters: like a tax, racial
discrimination is persistent, pervasive, must be dealt with,
cannot be avoided, and is not generally resisted. Taxes are
commonly regarded as ineluctable facts of human existence, as
in the old saw, "Nothing in life is certain, save death and
taxes." . . . And just as the state stands behind the collection of
the general taxes, Blacks often have good cause to view state
representatives such as police and judicial officers as IRS
agents for the Black Tax."
76. 2 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 3244 (compact ed. 1971). For a discussion of guid-
ance issued by the Internal Revenue Service (Service) on the definition of the word
"tax," see infia note 111.
77. 2 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 3244 (compact ed. 1971).
78. JODY DAVID ARMOUR, NEGROPHOBIA AND REASONABLE RACISM: THE HIDDEN
COSTS OF BEING BLACK IN AMERICA 13-14 (1997).
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It is not difficult to come across similar references to the "gender tax"
imposed on women," the "ethnicity tax" imposed on Latino/as,o or the
"gay tax" imposed on lesbians and gay men."
These uses of the word "tax" are not just an effective means of
communicating to those in the majority the nature and impact of the
burdens imposed on minority groups; they are also a subtle means of
persuading members of the majority of the unjustness of those burdens.
As I was writing this Article, I came across an op-ed piece in the New
York Times-on April 15 of all days-that captures the essence of what
lies behind this persuasive force:
The word "tax" was never pretty. But it has lately become the
ugliest word in the English language, right up there with its
evil twin, "death." Even in time of war, ostensibly patriotic
politicians blithely pledge to slay any tax that rears its ghastly
head. Public officials dodge work they know desperately needs
doing because of the possibility that it may cause an increase
82in taxes.
79. Eg., CAL. CIV. CODE § 51.6(a) (West 2008) ("This section shall be known, and may
be cited, as the Gender Tax Repeal Act of 1995."); Mark Klock, Unconscionability
and Price Discrimination, 69 TENN. L. REv. 317, 362 n.285 (2002); Katie Ervin
Carlson, Note, A Study of the Effectiveness ofMandated State Contraceptive Coverage in
Iowa and Missouri and the Case for a Federal Law, 54 DRulKE L. REv. 509, 510
(2006); Christine Vargas, Note, The EPICC Quest for Prescription Contraceptive In-
surance Coverage, 28 Am. J. L. & MED. 455, 456 (2002); Christl Dabu, For Canadian
Women, that Haircut May Soon Get Cheaper, CHRISTIAN ScI. MONITOR, Aug. 10,
2005, at 12; Troy Flint, Women Get Clipped for Services, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland,
Ohio), Mar. 26, 1999, at IC; William C. Rhoden, Fraternity and Liberty, Yes, but
They Left out Equality at the French Open, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2005, § 8, at 6.
80. Rachel F. Moran, What if Latinos Really Mattered in the Public Policy Debate?, 85
CAL. L. REv. 1315, 1336 & n.70 (1997).
81. Ed Bark, Ellen Is Out-and Down, DALLAS MORNING NEws, Feb. 25, 1998, at IC;
Susan Blatt, Letter to the Editor, Insult and an Extra Tax, SUNDAY OREGONIAN, Jan.
6, 2008, at El.
82. Richard Conniff, Abolish All "Taxes," N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2008, at A23; see Edward
J. McCaffery & Jonathan Baron, Thinking About Tax, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. PoL'Y & L.
106, 119 (2006) ("In sum, labels matter, and tax tends to be a negative one."); see also
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRo, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE FIGHT OVER
TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 4 (2005) ("Since [1994], eliminating all taxes on wealth
or income from wealth has become a matter of Republican orthodoxy. Indeed, as
stunning as the estate tax repeal was, it is a bellwether of a larger conflict-over the
future of progressive taxation in America."); id. at 266-78 (describing how estate tax
repeal is just part of a larger assault on progressive taxation more generally); Sheldon
D. Pollack, Republican Antitax Policy, 91 TAX NOTES 289 (2001) (tracing the histori-
cal roots of the Republican party's animus toward the taxation of income and wealth
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The author of this op-ed was quite right to go on to note that the
negative connotations of the word "tax" find their roots in the word's
etymology." According to the Oxford English Dictionary, the word "tax"
is apparently adapted from the Latin word taxire, which means "to cen-
sure, charge, tax with a fault; to rate, value, reckon, compute (at so
much), make a valuation of."" The inclusion of "censure" and "fault" in
this definition conveys a sense of disapproval, unfavorable criticism,
blaming, or condemning as well as the existence of some type of trans-
gression, defect, or imperfection." Tapping into these negative
overtones, references to the "Black tax," "gender tax," "ethnicity tax,"
and "gay tax" all send the signal that these outgroups have been singled
out as the (unfair) targets of societal condemnation or disapproval and
are being (unjustly) marked as defective or blameworthy. After all, why
else would society impose a special burden on these groups, if not as a
penalty for their transgression-that is, for the very fact of their being
different from the dominant group, whether in terms of race, ethnicity,
gender, or sexual orientation (or some combination of them)?
In characterizing the burdens imposed by the federal DOMA and
the state mini-DOMAs as a tax, I do aim, in part, to tap into the power
of these figurative uses of the word "tax" because labels can carry signifi-
cant weight in public discourse. To put it in the terminology of
cognitive psychology, labels can have a "framing" effect." In other
words, the same question can generate different answers depending on
how it is phrased. For example, opponents' effective relabeling of the
federal estate tax as the "death tax" proved a highly successful means of
changing the public's perception of the tax and of popularizing support
for the tax's repeal."' This rhetorical move was successful because the la-
and exploring its more fanatical iteration during the 1990s); id. at 289 (describing the
Republican party's focus on "antitax policy" as an "outright obsession" and "the very
raison d'etre of the Republican party").
83. Conniff, supra note 82.
84. 2 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 3244 (compact ed. 1971).
85. l id. at 365, 970-71.
86. See McCaffery & Baron, supra note 82, at 108 ("Framing refers to the effect whereby
the same question or choice set, described differently, can lead to different answers
. . . ."). In that article, McCaffery and Baron discuss the results of experiments testing
for the effects of framing in the way that people think about tax. See generally id. at
113-29. In an earlier article, McCaffery explained the relevance of cognitive psychol-
ogy to tax, arguing both that cognitive psychology can help to explain why our tax
system looks the way it does and that cognitive biases should be factored into any
general theory of tax. Edward J. McCaffery, Cognitive Theory and Tax, 41 UCLA L.
REV. 1861 (1994).
87. GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 82, at 76-85, 253-54; DAVID CAY JOHNSTON, PER-
FECTLY LEGAL: THE COVERT CAMPAIGN To RIG OUR TAx SYSTEM TO BENEFIT THE
SUPER RICH-AND CHEAT EVERYBODY ELSE 80-81 (2003).
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bel "estate tax" both conjures an image of someone very wealthy (i.e.,
wealthy enough to have an "estate" to worry about) and accurately con-
veys the impression that the tax only applies to the relative few in our
society who have amassed this level of wealth. However, by calling this
same tax the "death tax," there is a complete change in imagery. Instead
of conjuring images of a wealthy elite, the "death tax" brings to mind an
event that we all must eventually face and that no one can avoid-no
matter how hard they try-which can mislead taxpayers into thinking
that they are far more likely to be liable for the tax than they actually
are.88 At the same time, the label "death tax" conjures the highly negative
image of an unfeeling government sticking the deceased's survivors with
a tax bill at a time when they are grieving.
Similarly, those opposed to lesbian and gay rights have framed the
issue of legally recognizing same-sex relationships in terms of the need to
"protect" or "defend" so-called traditional marriage.89 In summarizing its
own thoughts on the institution, the U.S. Supreme Court succinctly
explains the importance to many of defending so-called traditional mar-
riage against attack:
[D]ecisions of this Court confirm that the right to marry is of
fundamental importance for all individuals. Long ago, in
Maynard v. Hill, the Court characterized marriage as "the most
important relation in life" and as "the foundation of the family
and of society, without which there would be neither civiliza-
tion nor progress." In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court recognized
that the right "to marry, establish a home and bring up chil-
dren" is a central part of the liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause, and in Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
88. See Dennis J. Ventry Jr., Straight Talk About the Estate and Gift Tax: Politics, Econom-
ics, and Morality, 89 TAX NOTES 1159, 1161 (2000) ("Seventeen percent of those
surveyed by Gallup in June indicated that they would 'personally benefit' from the
elimination of inheritance taxes. But less than 2 percent of all estates passing to heirs
in any given year pay transfer taxes."). With the changes in the federal estate tax in
2001, the percentage of estates subject to tax has decreased. CITIZENS FOR TAX Jus-
TICE, WHO PAID THE FEDERAL ESTATE TAX IN 2005?, at 1 (2007),
http://www.ctj.org/pdf/wherethemoneygoes.pdf (indicating that the 18,431 estate tax
returns filed in 2005 showing a taxable estate comprised only 0.8% of the people
who died in 2004).
89. Eg., Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996); Mar-
riage Protection Amendment, S.J. Res. 1, 109th Cong. (2005).
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. . . marriage was described as "fundamental to the very exis-
tence and survival of the race.,,0
Framing the question in this way and against this background conjures
an image of marriage as an ancient citadel that is under attack by (for-
eign) invaders. This rhetorical move has been successful because it puts
opponents of the DOMAs in the difficult position of having to con-
vince judges, legislators, and the electorate why they should open the
gates of the citadel wide to allow in these (foreign) invaders who are
bent on plundering and destroying their way of life.
Yet, through a disciplined reconceptualization of the DOMAs as a
tax on lesbian and gay families, lesbian and gay rights advocates and
their allies might just be able to shift the framing of this debate in the
same way that opponents of the estate tax did in the 1990s.9 ' Of par-
ticular importance to facilitating this shift in the rhetorical terrain is the
characterization of this tax not as one just on same-sex couples but as
one on lesbian and gay families. This move not only captures the rheto-
ric of opponents of lesbian and gay rights, who generally paint
themselves as champions of the nuclear family, but it also reflects the
reality that lesbian and gay families already exist-even in the face of
societal disapproval and even when they are already saddled with signifi-
cant burdens. At the time of the 2000 census, approximately 22% of all
households headed by male same-sex couples had children living with
them and approximately 34% of all households headed by female same-
sex couples had children living with them.92 These numbers have proba-
bly only grown during this decade." For instance, I personally know a
number of same-sex couples who have had children since 2000. Indeed,
when the time came to choose the cover art for my book Everyday Law
for Gays and Lesbians (and Those Who Care About Them), I did not have
to look far when the publisher suggested that we include a picture of a
lesbian or gay family on the cover. I quickly turned to my sister and her
partner, and asked them to appear on the cover with my two nieces and
nephew.
90. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (citations omitted); see Katherine M.
Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FoRDHAM L. REV. 2685, 2695 n.47 (2008) (collecting
several quotes from other courts).
91. See supra text accompanying notes 87-88.
92. TAVIA SIMMONS & MARTIN O'CONNELL, U.S. CENSUS BuREAu, CENSUs 2000 SPE-
cIAL REPORTS: MARRIED-COUPLE AND UNMARRIED-PARTNER HOUSEHOLDS: 2000, at
9 tbl.4 (2003), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/censr-5.pdf.
93. See Married with Children: Option fir More Gay Men, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS (Grand
Rapids, MI), Aug. 10, 2008, at A4.
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Even those who might applaud imposing a tax on lesbians and gay
men94 would probably be less likely to support a tax that penalizes chil-
dren for their parents' sexual orientation. As I have explained in the
context of discussing how to prepare for the coming legal battles over
lesbian and gay parenting:
[I]n the coming legal battles, if we are to be successful, we
must draw attention not to ourselves but to the best interests
of our children. When the focus is on the power of lesbian and
gay families to destabilize heterosexist norms, legislators and
judges, frightened by the idea of change, can quite easily give
free rein to their ingrained sexual prejudices. Experience
teaches us, however, that it is more difficult for those in power
to vent their animosity toward lesbian and gay parents when
they are confronted with the reality that their decisions will
also cause direct and tangible harm to innocent children by,
for example, depriving those children of parents whom they
know and love (or, in some cases, of any parents at all), health
insurance, adequate means of support, or the right to inherit."
In the ongoing political debate over same-sex marriage, advocates
for lesbian and gay rights seem to have recognized the power of moving
the focus away from the rights of lesbians and gay men-who are too
easily seen "as some disembodied and dehumanized 'other' that can be
vilified and scapegoated for society's problems""-and, instead, of plac-
ing the focus on the effect on a same-sex couple's children of denying
the couple access to the rights and obligations of marriage." But, faced
94. See, e.g., The Gay Tax, posting of JSM to ADEQUACY: NEWS FOR GRoWNuPs,
http://www.adequacy.org/stories/2001.6.27.51823.2094.html (June 27, 2001) (argu-
ing for the imposition of a tax on gay men because they are wasteful and "will buy
almost any old crap as long as it is marketed to them as being in some way 'camp' or
'ironic'"); Posting of mr Giblets to Topix, http://www.topix.com/forum/news/weird/
TBOBMV4TRABK7UTJD (Apr. 10, 2008, #1) ("why not have a gay tax to raise
revenue? . . . The extra 'pink tax' could be used to subsidise new roads, strip clubs,
gasoline, and building roads through forests."); Posting of ramsy to Topix,
http://www.topix.com/forum/news/weird/TBOBMV4TRABK7UTJD (Apr. 10,
2008, #2) (responding to mr Giblets' post, "I like where you are coming from with
this! Maybe-it could help pay for decorations they like to put up-Or-possibly pay for
the damaged youth caused by gay pride parades . . .
95. INFANTI, supra note 3, at 224.
96. Id. at 8.
97. Katherine M. Franke, The Politics ofSame-Sex Marriage Politics, 15 CoLum. J. GEN-
DER & L. 236, 240-42 (2006); S.J. Barrett, Note, For the Sake ofthe Children: A New
Approach to Securing Same-Sex Marriage Rights?, 73 BROOK. L. REv. 695, 697-709,
2010]1 343
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER C& LAW
with effective counterarguments, advocates of lesbian and gay rights
have encountered difficulty in leveraging this change in focus in a way
that shifts the rhetorical terrain to their advantage.' For example, oppo-
nents of same-sex marriage have, with some success, argued that a family
headed by a different-sex couple is the optimal milieu in which to raise
children and that different-sex couples are the only ones in need of the
stability provided by marriage because it is only their sexual liaisons that
can inadvertently result in procreation.
Recharacterizing the DOMAs as a tax on lesbian and gay families
might just provide the necessary leverage to overcome these counter-
arguments and to shift the rhetorical terrain to the advantage of lesbian
and gay rights advocates. Speaking in terms of the distinct financial dis-
advantages that the DOMAs impose on lesbian and gay families frames
the debate in a way that should strike a chord with a broad swath of
people, no matter their sexual orientation. In other words, talking about
taxes takes attention away from the sexual orientation of the heads of
household and fixes it instead on the financial stress-and, closely fol-
lowing on its heels, the instability-that an onerous tax burden can
place on a family. I have discussed at length elsewhere the power of tell-
ing our own stories in our own words, but have simultaneously
cautioned that we must be aware that some ways of telling our stories
are more powerful and effective than others. 00 This reframing of the
debate over same-sex marriage and the DOMAs is just such an instance
of recalibrating how we tell our own stories to make them as powerful
and effective agents of change as possible.
We can witness the power of focusing on concrete financial burdens
imposed on families by juxtaposing two actions by the Bush administra-
tion, which was clearly no friend of lesbians and gay men. In early 2007,
the U.S. Department of State rejected a lesbian U.S. citizen's passport
application because it included her married name, which she had
changed on her Massachusetts marriage license at the time that she wed
her same-sex partner.0o1 The State Department relied upon the federal
721-22 (2008); e.g., Human Rights Campaign, Families Matter, http://www.hrc.org/
documents/FamilyMatters-brochure.pdf (last visited Nov. 7, 2009).
98. Franke, supra note 97, at 242-44.
99. E.g., Standhardt v. Super. Ct. of the State of Ariz., 77 P.3d 451, 461-64 (Ariz. Ct.
App. 2003); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 23-26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005); Her-
nandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 7-8 (N.Y. 2006). But Cf In re Marriage Cases, 183
P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008).
100. INFANTI, supra note 3, at 13-19.
101. Dianne Williamson, Gay Right Springs a Leak, WORCESTER TEL. & GAZETTE
(Worcester, Mass.), Mar. 4, 2007, at BI. And this is not an isolated instance. See
James Burger, Feds Split on Same-Sex Name Changes, THE BAKERSFIELD CALIFOR-
344 [Vol.16:319
TAXING CIVIL RIGHTS GAINS
DOMA in reaching this decision, asserting that "same-sex couples seek-
ing a passport under a married name can't do so absent additional
documentation, and that the government doesn't recognize such name
changes based solely on marriage certificates, as it does for heterosexual
married couples."l 02 In contrast, in a memorandum made public in June
2008, the U.S. Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel con-
cluded that the child of a lesbian couple who had entered into a civil
union in Vermont was eligible for child's insurance benefits when the
nonbiological mother became eligible for Social Security disability bene-
fits.' 03 Under Vermont's civil union law, the nonbiological mother was
listed as a "second parent" on the child's birth certificate. The Office of
Legal Counsel relied on Vermont's recognition of the parent-child rela-
tionship in making its decision, even though Vermont's recognition of
that relationship stemmed directly from the couple's civil union (a rela-
tionship that the federal government does not recognize).
The federal government did not have to legally recognize a same-
sex relationship in either of these cases. In both situations, the state's
legal recognition of the same-sex relationship was merely a means to an
end (i.e., an inexpensive and expeditious change of name or establish-
ment of a parent-child relationship in the eyes of the law). The salient
differences between these two factual situations that, in my opinion,
explain the divergent results are the identity of the disadvantaged per-
son(s) and the concreteness and magnitude of the harm. In the case of
the rejected passport application, the only detriment was to the lesbian
who changed her name when she exercised her right to marry. She
ended up missing her planned vacation due to the rejection of her pass-
port application and would have to undertake inconvenient (both in
terms of hassle and expense) judicial proceedings to change her name
before resubmitting that application. Applying the federal DOMA to
her did no more than exact a penalty from her for being a lesbian who
dared to marry her same-sex partner as permitted by state law. In the
NIAN, Aug. 3, 2008, http://www.bakersfield.com/hourly-news/story/
512934.htrml; Megan A. Brooks, Stick a Finger in Your Eye and Break Your Heart All
over Again, http://www.1ibrarygrrrl.net/2007/08/17/380/ (Aug. 17, 2007).
102. Williamson, supra note 101 (attributing this statement to an unnamed State Depart-
ment spokesman).
103. See Editorial, Justice for Gays: The Bush Administration Rules that Children of Same-Sex
Couples Can Receive Their Social Security Benefits, WASH. POST, July 6, 2008, at B6;
Memorandum from Steven A. Engel, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., to the Acting
Gen. Counsel, Soc. Sec. Admin. (Oct. 16, 2007), http://www.justice.gov/olc/2007/
saadomaopinionl0-16-07final.pdf. In contrast to the Department of State, the Social
Security Administration appears to be willing to accept a same-sex couple's marriage
certificate as sufficient proof of a name change. See Burger, supra note 101; Brooks,
supra note 101.
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case of the child's Social Security benefits, however, a decision to apply
the federal DOMA to the interpretation of the Social Security Act
would have resulted in a significant, concrete financial disadvantage to
the child, because the mother had asked for the child's insurance bene-
fits to replace family income that was lost due to her disability. The
Office of Legal Counsel's decision thus helped to relieve the family's
tangible financial burdens and to make the child's family situation more
stable. A contrary decision would have punished the child for the par-
ents' sexual orientation and put the family at risk.'04
Speaking of the DOMAs as taxes has the potential to shift the
framing of the debate over same-sex marriage in the same way; that is,
away from a focus on the abstract rights of the same-sex couple and to-
ward a focus on the concrete and significant financial stresses that the
DOMAs impose on lesbian and gay families. Quite understandably,
some in the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) community
have expressed "unease with what feels like the deployment of children
as props that attest to our normalcy, a repudiation of our perversion.,,)o0
But it cannot be denied that the DOMAs have a real impact on the
children of same-sex couples. If nothing else, there are simply fewer fi-
nancial resources available to support the children when their parents are
forced to pay the tax imposed by the DOMAs.' I expect that few
among us would like to see their children punished in this way for their
own perceived misdeeds or transgressions.'0  Thus, especially in these
104. The Social Security Administration's apparent willingness to accept a same-sex cou-
ple's marriage certificate as proof of a name change, see supra note 103, might be
explained in similar terms. The inability to get a Social Security card with one's cor-
rect name on it may result in significant, concrete financial disadvantage to the
individual and her family, because it may prove difficult (if not impossible) for the
individual to obtain work without a match between the name on her Social Security
card and the name on her other documents (e.g., a driver's license). See Safe-Harbor
Procedures for Employers Who Receive a No-Match Letter, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,611,
45,621 (Aug. 15, 2007) (discussing the possibility that an employer who receives a
no-match letter from the Social Security Administration will simply fire the affected
employee).
105. Franke, supra note 97, at 239.
106. See infra Part II.B.1 for a rough estimate of the amount of the tax imposed by the
DOMAs.
107. In the context of considering an equal protection challenge to a statute that involved
a classification based on illegitimacy, the U.S. Supreme Court stated:
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's condem-
nation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But visiting
this condemnation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. More-
over, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic
concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to
individual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsible
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days of high food and fuel prices and a severe economic downturn, a
message that eschews talk of rights and that pairs antitax sentiment with
the need to relieve the financial strain on families will undoubtedly bet-
ter resonate with all Americans, whether gay or straight.'
To summarize, this shift in the framing of the debate could prove
to be an effective rhetorical means of (1) displacing the idea that the
DOMAs are necessary to protect the institution of marriage from some
imagined assault by same-sex couples and (2) replacing it with the idea
that the DOMAs are really nothing more than an unjust penalty im-
posed on same-sex couples and their children because they happen to be
different. Thus, by ceasing to refer to the DOMAs by their given
name-which only gives credence to the idea that they are a necessary
defensive or protective measure-and by constantly referring to them
instead as a tax on lesbian and gay families, we may help to undermine
support for these measures among those who are subject to sway.
B. Technically Speaking
Recasting the DOMAs as a tax on lesbian and gay families in an at-
tempt to shift the rhetorical terrain on which this front of the "culture
wars" is being waged is not all that I aim to do in this Article. As men-
tioned above, I addressed the figurative sense of the word "tax" first in
for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffectual-as well
as an unjust-way of deterring the parent.
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (footnote omitted). But
see, e.g., Evodus 20:5 ("Thou shalt not bow down thyself to them, nor serve them: for
I the LORD thy God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the
children unto the third and fourth generation of them that hate me."); Numbers
14:18 ("The LORD is longsuffering, and of great mercy, forgiving iniquity and
transgression, and by no means clearing the guilty, visiting the iniquity of the fathers
upon the children unto the third and fourth generation."). Indeed, the U.S. Supreme
Court now applies a heightened, "intermediate" level of scrutiny to equal protection
challenges to classifications based on illegitimacy. 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA & JOHN E.
NOWAK, TREATIsE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAw: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 18.14
(4th ed. 2008).
108. It is worth pausing here for a moment to note that, by moving the debate away from
marital status and toward the treatment of families, this same rhetoric could be de-
ployed to advocate in favor of extending legal protections to all families, regardless of
the marital status of those who head the family. An exploration of this broader argu-
ment is beyond the explicit scope of this Article, which is confined to a discussion of
the burdens imposed on same-sex couples who have entered into a marriage, civil un-
ion, or domestic partnership and their children. Nevertheless, in my brief concluding
remarks, I do consider how this Article might pave the way for making just such ar-
guments.
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order to distinguish this project somewhat from more purely rhetorical
uses of the word. My recharacterization of the burden imposed by the
DOMAs as a tax on lesbian and gay families is more than purely rhe-
torical because the DOMAs impose a burden that is also closely
analogous to a tax in the technical sense of the word.
In contrast to more purely rhetorical uses of the word-such as
Jody Armour's use of the phrase "Black tax" in the text quoted
above'"-the burden that the DOMAs impose on same-sex couples is
not the price that lesbians and gay men pay in their individual encoun-
ters with straight (and, sometimes, gay) people because of stereotypes
and prejudice based on sexual orientation (although we do pay that
price, too). Rather, it was our elected legislators and/or the voters who
purposefully and consciously imposed these burdens on same-sex cou-
ples through the formal legal mechanisms of legislation and/or
constitutional amendment. Consequently, this is not a diffuse (though
no less onerous) burden imposed in interactions with others in society,
but one that our state and federal governments specifically created, sanc-
tioned, and imposed by law-just as they have imposed other, more
formal taxes upon us.m
109. See supra text accompanying note 78.
110. In this way, the burden imposed by the DOMAs satisfies the definition of the word
"tax" in BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, which pointedly speaks of "[a] monetary charge
imposed by the government." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1496 (8th ed. 2004) (empha-
sis added). The more purely rhetorical uses of the word cannot satisfy this
requirement because the burdens to which they refer are generally not imposed by
law-though the stereotypes at the root of those burdens may nonetheless affect the
application of the law to individual members of the subordinated group. See, e.g.,
Erik Eckholm, Reports Find Persistent Racial Gap in Drug Arrests, N.Y. TIMEs, May 6,
2008, at A21.
Raising a similar issue, Dennis Ventry suggested to me in an e-mail exchange
about the topic of this Article that if the burdens imposed by the DOMAs are to be
viewed as a tax on same-sex couples, then it might be argued that any legal relief from
government burdens that LGBT individuals receive by reason of their sexual orienta-
tion should be treated as an exemption from tax that must be balanced against the
burden of the tax that the DOMAs impose on lesbian and gay families. In particular,
he suggested that the federal government's "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, which es-
sentially excludes lesbians and gay men from military service, could be viewed as a
sexual-orientation-based tax benefit that must be weighed against the tax burdens
imposed by the DOMAs. Such an argument would, however, miss the mark for two
reasons: First, as Dennis himself acknowledged, although compulsory military service
might be viewed as a form of in-kind tax, see THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON AN ALL-VOLUNTEER ARMED FORCE 23-28 (1970) (discussing the
"conscription tax"), available at http://rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG265/images/
webSO243.pdf, military service in this country is currently voluntary. Thus, there is
simply no tax from which the government can exempt LGBT individuals. As a result,
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" cannot be viewed as akin to a tax exemption for LGBT in-
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Having thus distinguished more purely rhetorical uses of the word
"tax," I would now like to turn to a discussion of the technical sense of
the word to show how the burdens imposed by the DOMAs fit that
sense of the word as well. By demonstrating that the burdens imposed
by the DOMAs are also a "tax" in the technical sense, my aim is to make
available additional grounds for challenging the constitutionality of
these measures and to provide lesbian and gay rights advocates with
some rhetorical ammunition for fighting against these taxes when these
additional constitutional challenges are either unavailable or unavailing.
As mentioned earlier, in its technical sense, the word "tax" is de-
fined as "[a] compulsory contribution to the support of government,
levied on persons, property, income, commodities, transactions, etc.
This definition can be broken down into three parts. Thus, for a levy to
dividuals. Second, the fact that someone is exempt from one tax but must pay an-
other tax should not, as a general matter, change the classification of either levy as a
tax. For example, the fact that the working poor might be exempt from the federal
income tax but subject to federal payroll tax does not change the character of either of
these levies as a tax. In the absence of the first reason why this argument misses the
mark, this second point would be relevant to the discussion infra Part III.C about the
fairness of the distribution of the tax burden. But, given that "Don't Ask, Don't Tell"
cannot be characterized as a tax exemption, this second point is not relevant to that
discussion.
111. See supra note 76. This definition is similar to the ones found in Black's Law Dic-
tionary and the Dictionary of Political Economy. BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1496
(8th ed. 2004) ("A monetary charge imposed by the government on persons, entities,
transactions, or property to yield public revenue."); 3 DICTIONARY OF POLITICAL
ECONomy 517 (Robert Harry Inglis Palgrave ed., 1910) ("'A tax is a compulsory con-
tribution of the wealth of a person or body of persons for the service of the public
powers.' (quoting C.F. BASTABLE, PUBLIC FINANCE 249 (2d ed. 1895) (footnote
omitted)).
Parallels can also be found in guidance from the Service. In a revenue ruling in-
terpreting I.R.C. § 164, which allows a deduction for certain taxes, the Service states
that "[a] tax is an enforced contribution, exacted pursuant to legislative authority in
the exercise of taxing power, and imposed and collected for the purpose of raising
revenue to be used for public or governmental purposes, and not as a payment for
some special privilege granted or service rendered." Rev. Rul. 57-345, 1957-2 C.B.
132, revoked on its facts by Rev. Rul. 60-366, 1960-2 C.B. 63. The Service adopts a
more tautological definition in the foreign tax credit regulations when it states, "[a]
foreign levy is a tax if it requires a compulsory payment pursuant to the authority of a
foreign country to levy taxes." Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(a)(2) (as amended in 1991).
Nonetheless, the Service does go on to clarify that a "penalty, fine, interest, or similar
obligation is not a tax, nor is a customs duty a tax," nor is a payment in exchange for
a specific economic benefit a tax. Id. It is not surprising that the Service's definitions
generally track ones found in dictionaries, because, as it has noted, "[t]he word 'taxes'
as used in the statute is nowhere defined in the Code, and, it must be 'given its ordi-
nary and commonly accepted meaning as established by the judicial decisions.'" Rev.
Rul. 60-366, 1960-2 C.B. 63 (quoting United Gas Improvement Co. v. Comm'r, 25
B.T.A. 1382, 1384 (1932)).
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be classified as a "tax": (1) there must be a "contribution"; (2) the con-
tribution must be "compulsory"; and (3) the contribution must be for
the "support of government." I will address each of these three compo-
nent parts of the definition in turn.
1. "Contribution"
The first question that must be addressed is what type of "contribu-
tion" the DOMAs require same-sex couples to make. Based on the
discussion above,1 2 the contribution that the DOMAs exact from same-
113sex couples takes the form of the monetary costs that those couples
112. See supra Part I.B.
113. Naturally, there are other, nonmonetary costs attendant to this stigmatization. For
example, there is the "feedback loop" between everyday discrimination and bias
crimes. As I have described elsewhere:
Everyday discrimination against lesbians and gay men marks them as an
appropriate target for inferior treatment, which contributes to the percep-
tion that they are likewise appropriate targets for violence, which, when
such violence occurs, then further reinforces the notion that lesbians and
gay men are appropriate targets for everyday discrimination. Some psy-
chologists view the sexual stigma that feeds and is fed by this loop as
creating an atmosphere of chronic stress for lesbians and gay men as they
confront, live in fear of, or hide in the closet from the effects of everyday
discrimination and bias crime victimization. This chronic stress, which is
in addition to the general stresses of life and is "socially based-that is, it
stems from social processes, institutions, and structures beyond the indi-
vidual," is referred to as "minority stress." Minority stress is associated with
adverse health effects (e.g., psychological distress) among lesbians and gay
men.
INFANTI, supra note 3, at 45-46 (quoting Ilan H. Meyer, Prejudice, Social Stress, and
Mental Health in Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Populations: Conceptual Issues and Re-
search Evidence, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 674, 676 (2003)) (footnotes omitted).
Moreover, the differential legal treatment of same-sex couples with regard to
family formation also takes a psychological toll on these couples:
Psychologically, the parent who second-parent adopts does not hold the
same power in the family because family members perceive their status to
be inferior both culturally and legally to that of the biological or first adop-
tive parent. This inequality can permeate not only the interactions within
the family, but can also be reinforced by interactions in other social institu-
tions. The result can be destabilizing if the parent feels like his or her
parental legitimacy is being questioned, or more crucially, could be ques-
tioned if the relationship ended. This gives incredible power to one parent.
While it may never be overtly used, it could have a corrosive effect on an
intact family relationship in subtle ways. Emotionally, the parent with the
perceived inferior position may not assert himself or herself either with the
child or their partner in regard to their children for fear of how it will be
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must incur (1) to hire lawyers to draft reams of legal documents and
undertake legal proceedings (e.g., to change a surname or adopt a part-
ner's child) to obtain a measure of extramarital recognition of their
familial relationships, (2) to invoke the machinery of the courts to carry
out those legal proceedings, and (3) to cover any ancillary services neces-
sary to achieve the desired legal ends (e.g., the home studies and
psychological evaluations that are sometimes necessary for a second-
parent or stepparent adoption).
To get a sense of the size of these costs, I contacted an attorney at
one of the major law firms here in Pittsburgh, where I live and teach.
14
This firm has an established nontraditional families practice group."'
The attorney reported that her firm charges for these services by the
hour, so the figures that she quoted (and that I have reproduced below)
received. In essence, the other family members could hold them emotion-
ally hostage.
Geographically, the entire family is held captive when the parents are not
confident they will be treated as a legitimate family regardless of where they
live or travel. When families are literally undone by simply entering a
state's border, it is difficult to imagine a more effective way of undermining
this type of family formation. As noted above, these real and perceived bar-
riers exact a toll on the family's ability to exist to the fullest extent.
Whereas different-sex families take the right to travel for granted, same-sex
families must weigh the risks against the benefits. These families are bound
to the states that are willing to acknowledge them.
Deirdre M. Bowen, The Parent Trap: Differential Familial Power in Same-Sex Fami-
lies, 15 Wm. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 1, 40-41 (2009).
Notwithstanding the significant nonmonetary costs of stigmatization, I have fo-
cused my attention here on the monetary costs that the DOMAs impose on same-sex
couples because, in the United States, taxes are conventionally assessed based on
monetary value (e.g., the fair market value of property, the dollar amount (or dollar-
equivalent) of income, and the fair market value of an individual's total wealth or as-
sets) and are paid in cash.
114. Many thanks go to Lisa Philipps for suggesting that I attempt to quantify these costs.
115. Given their experience with, and reputation for, legal planning for same-sex couples,
I expected that they would most easily be able to quantify for me the attorney's fees
that would be incurred to draft these legal documents and undertake these legal pro-
ceedings. Naturally, these figures are not meant to be representative of what every
same-sex couple will pay; to be clear, I undertook no systematic survey of attorneys in
Pittsburgh, or anywhere else. My aim in seeking out this information was much more
modest; that is, simply to provide a sense of the magnitude of the costs that the
DOMAs impose on same-sex couples in a city of modest size with a modest cost of
living. See Andrew Druckenbrod, PSO Tour Touts Pittsburgh's Assets to Europe, Prrr.
PosT-GAzETrE, Jan. 20, 2008, at El (citing Pittsburgh's comparatively low cost of
living as a factor in a German company's decision to locate its North American
headquarters here); U.S. Cities with Population over 100,000, http://
www.infoplease.com/ipa/AO108
6 76 .html (last visited Nov. 7, 2009) (indicating that,
in 2005, Pittsburgh ranked 57 among U.S. cities with a population over 100,000).
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are merely estimates or ranges based on the firm's past experience." 6 The
attorney indicated that the cost of drafting wills, living wills, and powers
of attorney for healthcare and finances, which are usually done together,
range from $1,000 to $2,500. The cost of drafting trusts depends on the
complexity of those trusts, and is usually $500 or more. In the case of
domestic partnership agreements, each partner in the couple has his/her
own attorney. The cost to the partner represented by the firm I con-
tacted ranges from $1,500 to $4,000, depending on the complexity of
the agreement and the extent of negotiations with the other attorney. A
shared parenting agreement typically costs about $1,500. Second-parent
adoptions cost from $2,500 to $5,000, depending on the amount of
time spent in court appearances. In all, the total amount of charges in-
cluded in the ballpark estimate provided by this attorney ranges from
$7,000 to $13,500.117 It is worth noting that this estimate does not ei-
ther (1) represent all of the potential costs to be incurred by the couple
(e.g., even in terms of attorney's fees alone, it does not include the cost
of the second counsel in negotiations over a domestic partnership
agreement) or (2) account for the fact that unusual circumstances some-
times arise that result in an increase in the estimated fees.
Same-sex couples are asked to incur these significant monetary
costs simply to duplicate legal protections that should already be in-
cluded in the price of registering their marriage, civil union, or domestic
partnership. And, once these costs are quantified in this way, it becomes
116. E-mail from Maureen Cohon, Counsel, Buchanan Ingersoll & Rooney, P.C., to
Anthony C. Infanti, Assoc. Prof. of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law
(June 11, 2008, 12:21 PM) (on file with author). All of the figures in this paragraph
come from this same e-mail.
117. Some might argue that same-sex couples could avoid these costs by preparing the
documents themselves. Although this may be possible with respect to certain docu-
ments (e.g., advance directives), it is not possible or advisable with respect to other
documents (e.g., wills, living trusts, domestic partnership agreements, and shared
parenting agreements), because preparation of those documents requires legal knowl-
edge and an awareness of the unique legal issues faced by same-sex couples (e.g., the
need to lay the groundwork to fend off family members' challenges on grounds of
undue influence or coercion). See INFANTI, supra note 3, ch. 7. Notably, these costs
cannot be avoided even where one member of the couple possesses the requisite
knowledge because she is an attorney. Ethical rules prohibit a lawyer from undertak-
ing representation if it will give rise to a concurrent conflict of interest (i.e., when the
"the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client"). MODEL
RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(1) (2002). There is always a possibility that a
conflict might exist where a lawyer represents a married couple in estate planning
matters; yet, it would seem almost certain that such a conflict would exist where one
of the represented spouses is the lawyer herself. Id. cmt. Moreover, judicial proceed-
ings to change a surname or to complete a second-parent or stepparent adoption
would almost certainly require the help of a lawyer familiar with these areas.
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much easier to see the significant, disparate impact of the DOMAs
along class lines. Simply put, many same-sex couples will not be able to
afford one-half or one-quarter (or, in some cases, any) of these costs.
Same-sex couples finding themselves in this unfortunate position will
have no choice but to forfeit many (and, in some cases, all) of the legal
protections conferred by their marriage, civil union, or domestic part-
nership when they cross state lines or deal with the federal government.
In these situations, the "contribution" is forcibly taken in kind rather
than in cash, much like a property tax"' that is satisfied through foreclo-
sure on the property subject to tax when the taxpayer does not have the
means to pay the tax in cash. In contrast, different-sex married couples
are not asked to incur such monetary costs (or risk a forcible taking) in
order to obtain legal recognition of either their marital relationship or
their parental relationship with a child of the marriage. Indeed, a port-
able version of this legal recognition comes automatically with the (in
comparison, rather nominal) price of their marriage license (recall from
the discussion above that a marriage license costs only fifty dollars in
Boston, Massachusetts)." Thus, the DOMAs clearly impose unique and
identifiable monetary costs on same-sex couples who have entered into a
marriage, civil union, or domestic partnership, if those couples are to
have their relationship with each other and their children legally recog-
nized outside of the jurisdiction of celebration of the marriage, civil
union, or domestic partnership.120 For those without the means to pay
some or all of these monetary costs, the DOMAs still exact a contribu-
tion from the same-sex couple by forcibly taking in kind of what they
are unable to take in cash.
118. See infra Part iII.A.2 for further discussion of how the tax imposed by the DOMAs is
akin to a property tax on the store of legal rights and obligations associated with
same-sex marriages, civil unions, and domestic partnerships.
119. See CrrY oF BosToN, supra note 41 and accompanying text.
120. Some might argue that different-sex married couples also pay attorneys to draft legal
documents touching on their relationship (e.g., wills) and that such costs are, there-
fore, not unique to same-sex couples. However, different-sex couples do not have
these documents drafted in order to have their marriages recognized; rather, they have
these documents drafted to alter the default legal rules that apply to them precisely
because their marriages are legally recognized. To make the point even more starkly, I
imagine that a different-sex married couple would register shock if you were to sug-
gest that the husband should undergo the intrusion of, and incur the significant
monetary costs related to, adopting each of the children who are born to the couple
during the marriage to backstop the legal presumption of paternity.
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2. "Compulsory"
This leads directly to the next question that must be addressed;
namely, whether this contribution is "compulsory." Same-sex couples
are, in a sense, doubly compelled to make this contribution to the sup-
port of the government. They experience an internal compulsion to
incur the costs that comprise the "contribution" as well as the more con-
ventional external (i.e., legal) compulsion to do so.
a. Internal Compulsion
To understand the internal compulsion, it will be helpful to re-
member that we are concerned here with individuals who have already
taken the step of legalizing their relationships. These couples felt the
need to publicly acknowledge their relationships, to protect and support
each other, and to protect and support their current or future children
(should they decide to have any). After all, the legal rights and obliga-
tions associated with marriage (or its legal equivalent, in the case of civil
unions and domestic partnerships) largely revolve around the mutual
protection and support of the couple and the protection and support of
their children. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court made this
abundantly clear when it undertook to list many of the legal rights and
obligations associated with marriage in its decision extending the right
to marry to same-sex couples. It is worth quoting this summary at
length:
The benefits accessible only by way of a marriage license are
enormous, touching nearly every aspect of life and death ....
With no attempt to be comprehensive, we note that some of
the statutory benefits conferred by the Legislature on those
who enter into civil marriage include, as to property: joint
Massachusetts income tax filing; tenancy by the entirety (a
form of ownership that provides certain protections against
creditors and allows for the automatic descent of property to
the surviving spouse without probate); extension of the benefit
of the homestead protection (securing up to $300,000 in eq-
uity from creditors) to one's spouse and children; automatic
rights to inherit the property of a deceased spouse who does
not leave a will; the rights of elective share and of dower
(which allow surviving spouses certain property rights where
the decedent spouse has not made adequate provision for the
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survivor in a will); entitlement to wages owed to a deceased
employee; eligibility to continue certain businesses of a de-
ceased spouse; the right to share the medical policy of one's
spouse; thirty-nine week continuation of health coverage for
the spouse of a person who is laid off or dies; preferential op-
tions under the Commonwealth's pension system; preferential
benefits in the Commonwealth's medical program ... ; access
to veterans' spousal benefits and preferences; financial protec-
tions for spouses of certain Commonwealth employees (fire
fighters, police officers, prosecutors, among others) killed in
the performance of duty; the equitable division of marital
property on divorce; temporary and permanent alimony
rights; the right to separate support on separation of the par-
ties that does not result in divorce; and the right to bring
claims for wrongful death and loss of consortium, and for fu-
neral and burial expenses and punitive damages resulting from
tort actions.
Exclusive marital benefits that are not directly tied to property
rights include the presumptions of legitimacy and parentage of
children born to a married couple; and evidentiary rights, such
as the prohibition against spouses testifying against one an-
other about their private conversations, applicable in both civil
and criminal cases. Other statutory benefits of a personal na-
ture available only to married individuals include qualification
for bereavement or medical leave to care for individuals related
by blood or marriage; an automatic "family member" prefer-
ence to make medical decisions for an incompetent or disabled
spouse who does not have a contrary health care proxy; the
application of predictable rules of child custody, visitation,
support, and removal out-of-State when married parents di-
vorce; priority rights to administer the estate of a deceased
spouse who dies without a will, and requirement that surviv-
ing spouse must consent to the appointment of any other
person as administrator; and the right to interment in the lot
or tomb owned by one's deceased spouse.
Where a married couple has children, their children are also
directly or indirectly, but no less auspiciously, the recipients of
the special legal and economic protections obtained by civil
marriage. Notwithstanding the Commonwealth's strong public
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policy to abolish legal distinctions between marital and non-
marital children in providing for the support and care of
minors, the fact remains that marital children reap a measure
of family stability and economic security based on their par-
ents' legally privileged status that is largely inaccessible, or not
as readily accessible, to nonmarital children. Some of these
benefits are social, such as the enhanced approval that still at-
tends the status of being a marital child. Others are material,
such as the greater ease of access to family-based State and
Federal benefits that attend the presumptions of one's parent-
121age.
In reading this list, one cannot help but be struck by society's felt
need to facilitate mutual protection and support within (at least some)
loving relationships.122 By marrying, a couple is provided immediate ac-
cess to a legal framework that affords the couple a number of
protections, among which are a special form of property ownership (i.e.,
tenancy by the entirety), homestead protections, inheritance rights, sur-
vivor's rights to a deceased spouse's wages and to continue a deceased
spouse's business, access to health coverage, access to pension and vet-
eran's benefits, financial protections on the breakup of the relationship,
the right to sue if a third party kills or injures one's spouse, evidentiary
privileges that protect the couple's private conversations, qualification
for leave to care for or support each other in time of illness or the death
of a family member, and the right to make healthcare decisions for each
other in the absence of an advance directive. The facilitation of mutual
protection and support also extends to the couple's children, who bene-
fit from presumptions of parentage and predictable child support and
custody rules in the event of the breakup of the family. It should come
as no surprise, then, that the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
went on to state that, "[b]ecause it fulfils yearnings for security, safe ha-
ven, and connection that express our common humanity, civil marriage is
an esteemed institution, and the decision whether and whom to marry is
among life's momentous acts of self-definition. In fact, the court
went so far as to contend that, "[w]ithout the right to marry-or more
121. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 955-57 (Mass. 2003) (cita-
tions omitted).
122. See Taunya Lovell Banks, Toward a Global Critical Feminist Vision: Domestic Work
and the Nanny Tax Debate, 3 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 1, 7 (1999) ("Laws reflect
shared social values and play an important role in shaping societal perceptions of
these values.").
123. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 955 (emphasis added).
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properly, the right to choose to marry-one is excluded from the full
range of human experience and denied full protection of the laws for
one's 'avowed commitment to an intimate and lasting human relation-
ship."'
24
Some in the LGBT community disagree with this assessment of the
importance that should be accorded to marriage because marriage is
"[s]teeped in a patriarchal system that looks to ownership, property, and
dominance of men over women as its basis."125 Importantly, they protest
that fighting for the legal recognition of same-sex marriage "will not
transform our society from one that makes narrow, but dramatic, dis-
tinctions between those who are married and those who are not married
to one that respects and encourages choice of relationships and family
diversity., 126 Some have also questioned the headlong embrace of legal
recognition and regulation of same-sex relationships by the state when,
so recently, those same relationships were subject to criminal sanction.127
Instead of seeking the right to marry, some members of the LGBT
community argue that we should seek to "bridge the economic and
privilege gap between the married and the unmarried."l 28 They would
fight for the recognition (in some cases legal, in others not) that other
types of relationships are equally valuable as marriage; for the elimina-
tion of marital conditions on access to government support and benefits
(e.g., healthcare, housing, Social Security, and pension plans); and for "a
larger effort to strengthen the security and stability of diverse households
and families."'129 The focus of these LGBT critics is thus also squarely on
facilitating the ability of those in relationships to protect and support
each other-the key difference being that these LGBT critics would not
fetter access to legal and other structures that facilitate mutual protec-
tion and support with any requirement that the relationship take a
marriage-like form.
In short, both those who extol the virtues of marriage and those
who wish to knock marriage from its privileged pedestal recognize the
central importance of mutual protection and support in all loving and
familial relationships, whether that mutual protection and support takes
124. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 957 (citation omitted).
125. Paula Ettelbrick, Since when Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, reprinted in LESBIANS,
GAY MEN, AND THE LAw 402 (William B. Rubenstein ed., 1993).
126. Id.; see generally NANcY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE:
VALUING ALL FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008).
127. See generally Franke, supra note 97.
128. Ettelbrick, supra note 125, at 405; see also POLIKOFF, supra note 126, at 1-10.
129. See Beyond Same-Sex Marriage: A New Strategic Vision for All Our Families & Rela-
tionships, http://www.beyondmarriage.org/full-statement.html (July 26, 2006)
(emphasis added); see generally Franke, supra note 90.
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place inside, outside, or in the shadow of the law. Given the generally
acknowledged centrality of mutual protection and support to commit-
ted relationships and the fact that the same-sex couples with whom I am
primarily concerned in this Article have already chosen to access the
publicly established framework for providing such protection and sup-
port by entering into a marriage, civil union, or domestic partnership, it
can only be expected that they will feel compelled to shore up or reestab-
lish portions of that framework that the federal and some state
governments have actively undermined or completely eroded. As men-
tioned earlier,13 couples may vary in the extent to which they shore up
this framework of protection and support because different couples will
value different portions of this framework differently. Further contribut-
ing to the variation between couples is the fact that different couples will
have different levels of resources, which means that some will do better
than others-and some will spend more than others-in shoring up the
legal protections for their relationship. But this in no way changes the
compulsory nature of these expenses; it simply makes the amount of the
"contribution" exacted from same-sex couples variable-and, in all like-
lihood, roughly progressive-in nature."' And, naturally leading us into
a discussion of the external compulsion to make this contribution, for
those who do not have the money to pay for some or all of these ex-
penses (and for those who choose to forego certain legal protections),
the DOMAs simply take in kind (that is, in forfeited legal protections)
what they cannot (or do not) take in cash.
b. External Compulsion
The more conventional "compulsion" that is associated with taxes is
the external, legal compulsion that the government uses to exact the re-
quired contribution from recalcitrant taxpayers. As described
immediately above, most same-sex couples are willing payers of the tax
imposed by the DOMAs. These couples' internal compulsion to protect
and support each other and their children ensures that they will take the
necessary steps-and incur the associated monetary costs-to shore up
the legal protections that the DOMAs have undermined or eroded.
Some couples will, however, find themselves either unwilling or finan-
130. See supra note 51.
131. I expect that the amount of the contribution will result in a roughly progressive tax
because those with greater means will likely spend more on re-creating the rights and
obligations of marriage-they will have the wherewithal both to compile a more
complete set of legal documents and to hire service providers who charge a higher fee.
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cially unable to incur some or all of the required "contribution." The
federal government and the states with mini-DOMAs do not let these
"recalcitrant" taxpayers off the hook.
As mentioned above, in these situations, the tax imposed by the
DOMAs acts much like a property tax. When the government imposing
a property tax is unable to collect the tax in cash, it takes the property
subject to tax in satisfaction of the taxes owed. The property is presuma-
bly of some value, and, as a result, the government can sell the property
for cash and use the proceeds as it sees fit. Similarly, when same-sex
couples find themselves unable to pay all or part of the tax imposed by
the DOMAs in cash, the federal government and the states with mini-
DOMAs take the unpaid tax in kind. In other words, in lieu of cash,
these governments are willing to take some or all of the legal rights and
obligations associated with same-sex marriages, civil unions, and domes-
tic partnerships. These legal rights and obligations are both valuable13 2
and, as I describe more fully below,1" akin to property. Although the
government cannot sell this valuable property to obtain cash in the same
way that it can sell a piece of land for cash when property taxes are in
arrears, this compelled contribution is nonetheless to the "support of
government," as described in the next section.
3. "Support of Government"
The final question that must be addressed is whether the contribu-
tion exacted from same-sex couples, however compulsory, is to the
"support of government." Some might be wondering how I can get past
this hurdle, given that most of the cost of replicating the legal protec-
tions of a marriage, civil union, or domestic partnership makes its way
not into the coffers of the federal government or the states with mini-
DOMAs, but into the hands of private attorneys and ancillary service
providers. Even the cost of invoking the help of the courts often re-
dounds not to the benefit of the federal government or the states with
mini-DOMAs, but to the benefit of the state where the couple resides
(or previously resided) and entered into their legal relationship. How,
then, is this compulsory contribution "to the support of [the] govern-
ment" imposing the burden on same-sex couples?
132. Could you really describe rights or obligations that have been classified by the U.S.
Supreme Court as "fundamental," see infra note 199 and accompanying text, as any-
thing less?
133. See infra Part III.A.2.
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The answer to this question lies in the literature on so-called im-
plicit taxes. Economists and tax academics draw a distinction between
"explicit" and "implicit" taxes."' Myron Scholes and Mark Wolfson suc-
cinctly explain the distinction as follows:
[W]hen two assets give rise to identical pretax cash flows, but
the cash flows to one asset are taxed more favorably than those
to the other asset, taxpayers will bid for the right to hold the
tax-favored asset. As a result, the price of the tax-favored asset
will increase relative to the price of the tax-disfavored asset and
the before-tax rates of return on the tax-favored asset will de-
crease (relative to the before-tax return on the tax-disfavored
asset). And since the before-tax cash flows for the two invest-
ments are identical, the pretax rate of return to the tax-favored
asset will fall below that for the tax-disfavored asset. In impor-
tant special cases, their prices will adjust such that their after-tax
rates of return will be the same to all investors. In fact...,
without further tax rule restrictions or market frictions, the
equalization of after-tax rates of return is a necessary condition
for market equilibrium.
Given differences in tax treatment, if after-tax returns are to be
equalized, then before-tax rates of return must differ across the
assets. More lightly taxed investments require lower before-tax
rates of return than do more heavily taxed investments. As a re-
sult, investors pay taxes explicitly on heavily taxed investments
and they pay taxes implicitly on lightly taxed investments
through lower before-tax rates of return.135
For example, consider the differential treatment of municipal and
other bonds. The interest on municipal bonds is generally exempt from
federal income tax. 136 The interest on these bonds is tax-favored when
compared with the interest on comparable corporate or Treasury bonds,
134. E.g., MYRON S. SCHOLES & MAlue A. WOLFSON, TAXES AND BUSINESS STRATEGY: A
PLANNING APPROACH 83-99 (1992); Charlotte Crane, Some Evplicit Thinking About
Implicit Taxes, 52 SMU L. REv. 339 passim (1999); Calvin H. Johnson, A Ther-
mometer for the Tax System: The Overall Health of the Tax System as Measured by
Implicit Tax, 56 SMU L. REV. 13 passim (2003); Michael S. Knoll, Of Fruit and
Trees: The Relationship Between Income and Wealth Taxes, 53 TAX L. REv. 587, 598-
601 (2000); Michael S. Knoll, The UBIT: Leveling an Uneven Playing Field or Tilting
a Level One?, 76 FoRDHAM L. REV. 857, 874-79 (2007).
135. SCHOLES & WOLFSON, supra note 134, at 83-84.
136. I.R.C. § 103 (2006).
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because the interest on corporate and Treasury bonds is fully taxable.
Due to the tax benefit associated with municipal bonds, "[i]nvestors bid
up the prices of these municipal bonds such that their before-tax return
is lower than the return on fully taxable bonds."' 7 Accordingly, investors
in corporate or Treasury bonds pay explicit taxes (i.e., the federal income
tax imposed on the interest that they receive), and investors in munici-
pal bonds pay implicit taxes-in the form of a reduced rate of return on
an otherwise comparable investment. In a perfect market, one would
expect the explicit and implicit tax rates on these comparable invest-
ments to be equal.
To whom is this implicit tax paid? In the case of our municipal
bond example, the implicit tax is paid to the state or local government
that issued the bonds, as that government is the intended recipient of
the benefit of the federal income tax exemption. The state or local gov-
ernment issuing the bonds receives the benefit of the tax exemption in
the form of lowered borrowing costs.139 Because these payments are not
made directly to the federal government (i.e., the government providing
the tax exemption in this situation), some commentators have criticized
the application of the "tax" label to these payments." But this view ex-
alts form over substance, making it inconsistent with how a levy's
137. SCHOLES & WOLFSON, supra note 134, at 85; see Johnson, supra note 134, at 13.
138. SCHOLES & WOLFSON, supra note 134, at 87-88; see Johnson, supra note 134, at 14
("A tax system with an implicit tax lower than the maximum statutory tax rate is not
a healthy tax system. Using the tax system to give subsidies or incentives under such
conditions is inefficient, even immoral. Paying directly with dollars is cheaper and
more efficient.").
139. SCHOLES & WOLFSON, supra note 134, at 87; Johnson, supra note 134, at 16; see 1
BORIs 1. BITrKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES
AND GIFTS 15.1.1. (1999) ("With the waning of the doctrine of intergovernmental
tax immunity, Congress has preserved the exemption [from tax of interest on mu-
nicipal bonds] as a kind of revenue sharing, enabling states and cities to borrow at
interest rates lower than those on taxable obligations of similar quality."). However,
because markets are not perfect, the purchasers of the bonds are typically able to cap-
ture part of the intended benefit for themselves. This is possible because market
forces will tend to drive the implicit tax rate down to that of the marginal investor,
thereby creating a windfall for anyone who pays explicit tax at a rate higher than the
marginal investor. SCHOLES & WOLFSON, supra note 134, at 96-97; Johnson, supra
note 134, at 17-18.
140. See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 134, at 13 n.2 ("The term 'implicit tax' is conventional,
but it is in some senses a terribly misleading name. The implicit tax does not provide
any revenue for the federal government to pay for the Marines or other government
programs."); David A. Weisbach, Implications of Implicit Taxes, 52 SMU L. REV.
373, 374 (1999) ("Implicit taxes are misnamed. Implicit taxes are not taxes in the
sense of the confiscation of resources by the government. They are simply asset price
adjustments in response to a tax benefit or detriment.").
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classification as a "tax" is normally determined."' In fact, as Scholes and
Wolfson have explained, "[t]his taxing scheme, which uses implicit taxes
to subsidize municipal spending programs, is similar to an alternative
scheme in which all bonds (including municipal bonds) are fully taxable
at the federal level and the federal government remits the tax collected
on municipal bonds to each issuinp authority."'42 Thus, echoing the in-
sights of tax expenditure analysis,' 3 Scholes and Wolfson make it clear
that implicit taxes (such as those paid by municipal bond holders) are
the equivalent of explicit tax payments to the federal government cou-
pled with a federal spending program directing those funds to the state
and local governments that are the intended, ultimate recipients of the
government's largesse.
Similarly, the monetary costs that the federal and state governments
impose on same-sex couples through the DOMAs can be viewed as the
equivalent of the imposition of an explicit tax on those couples that is
then used to fund a direct spending program that provides monetary
awards to those who facilitate the intended erosion of LGBT civil rights
gains.' 4 Even when a same-sex couple cannot afford to pay the tax im-
141. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text. Similarly, in describing the constitu-
tional limitations on taxation in Australia, Miranda Stewart and Kristen Walker note
that the Australian courts have not adopted a rigid conception of a payment to the
support of government either: "It has been held that ... a levy may be a tax in certain
other circumstances, for example, where it is exacted 'by a non-public authority' or
for payment to a private organization rather than into Consolidated Revenue, albeit
for a 'public purpose'." Miranda Stewart & Kristen Walker, Australia-National Re-
port, 15 MIcH. ST. J. INT'L L. 193, 212 (2007) (footnotes omitted).
142. SCHOLES & WOLFSON, supra note 134, at 87. It is worth underscoring that what
makes the "tax" label appropriate, according to Scholes and Wolfson, is not that the
implicit tax is actually paid to a state or local government-that is merely a fortuitous
happenstance because implicit taxes can be paid to anyone. Rather, what makes the
"tax" label appropriate is the fact that the implicit tax is the equivalent of the federal
government (the government that, in this case, created the implicit tax) imposing an
explicit tax on the interest earned on municipal bonds and then enacting a direct fed-
eral spending program funneling the tax revenue raised from that explicit tax to (in
this case, coincidentally) state and local governments.
143. For a description of tax expenditure analysis and the numerous critiques of it, see
Infanti, A Tax Crit Identity Crisis?, supra note 73, at 717-44.
144. Some might argue that the DOMAs do not impose a tax at all, but merely a fee for
the recognition of the legal relationships among same-sex partners and their children.
This argument is, however, misguided. One of the hallmarks of a fee is a direct rela-
tionship between the fee being charged and the value of either the benefit being
provided to the fee-payer or the burden being created by the fee-payer. E.g., Cham-
berlain, supra note 68, at 173-77; Spitzer, supra note 67, at 353; see, e.g., United
States v. U.S. Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 370 (1998); Massachusetts v. United States,
435 U.S. 444, 464 (1978); Lightwave Techs., L.L.C. v. Escambia County, 804 So.
2d 176, 180 (Ala. 2001); Marion v. Baioni, 850 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Ark. 1993); State v.
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posed by the DOMAs in cash, the actions of the government still mimic
this combination of an explicit tax with a direct spending program (i.e.,
a taking of value from one taxpayer and a transfer of that value to an-
other). When a same-sex couple is without the requisite cash, the
government takes some or all of the valuable legal rights and obligations
associated with the couple's marriage, civil union, or domestic partner-
ship in satisfaction of the tax.14 As mentioned above, the government
cannot turn around and sell these rights for cash, but it need not do so
in order to achieve its purpose. For the purpose of imposing this tax on
lesbian and gay families is not to raise general revenue,4" but to protect,
preserve, and enhance the value of so-called traditional marriage. Thus,
Medeiros, 973 P.2d 736, 742 (Haw. 1999); Bolt v. City of Lansing, 587 N.W.2d
264, 269 (Mich. 1998); Clay County Citizens for Fair Taxation v. Clay County
Comm'n, 452 S.E.2d 724, 727 (W. Va. 1994); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.901-2(a)(2)(i)
(as amended in 1991) ("[A] foreign levy is not pursuant to a foreign country's author-
ity to levy taxes, and thus is not a tax, to the extent a person subject to the levy
receives (or will receive), directly or indirectly, a specific economic benefit ... from
the foreign country in exchange for payment pursuant to the levy.").
In the case of the DOMAs, there is no relationship whatsoever between the
amount paid by same-sex couples and the benefits provided by, or burdens imposed
upon, the federal or other state governments. In most cases, the amount being paid
has a direct relationship to only one thing: the hourly charge of the couple's attorney,
who has been asked to prepare all of the necessary documents to secure legal recogni-
tion of the couple's relationship (to the extent possible). Similarly, the cost of any
ancillary services bears a direct relationship only to the hourly rate or per-transaction
charge of the service provider. Moreover, as mentioned in the text above, the amount
charged for judicial proceedings-for example, a judicial name change or an adop-
tion-has a direct relationship only to the cost to the government of the state
providing these services, and not to any benefit provided by, or burden imposed
upon, the federal or other state governments.
145. In fact, even when a same-sex couple can afford to pay the entire amount of the "con-
tribution" in cash, the federal government and the states with mini-DOMAs still take
part of the couple's valuable legal rights and obligations in kind because there are cer-
tain legal rights and obligations that only the state can provide (i.e., these rights and
obligations cannot be re-created through the execution of documents or undertaking
of legal proceedings). See supra note 62.
146. As is the case with any tax penalty, the government would probably be delighted to
collect no tax at all, because that would mean that it had completely eliminated the
behavior to be discouraged. See infra note 148.
147. As Representative Henry Hyde, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, stated during
the Subcommittee markup of H.R. 3396:
[S]ame-sex marriage, if sanctified by the law, if approved by the law, le-
gitimates a public union, a legal status that most people ... feel ought to
be illegitimate . . . And in so doing it trivializes the legitimate status of
marriage and demeans it by putting a stamp of approval on a union that
many people ... think is immoral.
H.R. REP. No. 104-664, supra note 4, at 16. Incidentally, this tax penalizes same-sex
couples for having the audacity to seek access to the rights and obligations of
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the government takes the valuable property of one group (i.e., same-sex
couples) in order to enhance the value of the property of another group
(i.e., married different-sex couples). This is no less a transfer than the
combination of an explicit tax collected in cash coupled with a direct
spending program in which that cash is awarded to those who facilitate
the intended erosion of LGBT civil rights gains. Accordingly, in sub-
stance, even if not in form, the compulsory contributions exacted from
same-sex couples by the DOMAs are to the "support of government."
Much like tax provisions that act as disguised penalties, these contri-
butions (whether made in cash or in kind) directly further the interest of
the government in discouraging the legal recognition of same-sex cou-
ples and their families by making that recognition either more expensive
or, in the case of those who cannot afford the expense, of limited signifi-
cance.
Interestingly, when viewed from this perspective, the federal and
state governments that have enacted DOMAs are able to force same-sex
couples to fund their own government-sponsored oppression. They are
also able to turn those who are ostensibly trying to help same-sex cou-
ples cope with this oppression (e.g., attorneys, adoption agencies, etc.)
into unwitting, paid accomplices in that concerted effort to oppress.
Those same-sex couples who cannot afford to fund their own oppression
are relegated to standing by powerless as the federal and state govern-
ments instead take away the valuable property that the couples do have;
namely, the hard-fought legal protections that they had acquired for
themselves and their children when they married or entered into a civil
union or domestic partnership.
III. RAMIFICATIONS OF AFFIXING THE "TAX" LABEL ON THE DOMAs
Having now established that the DOMAs meet the technical defi-
nition of a tax-they exact from same-sex couples who have entered into
a marriage, civil union, or domestic partnership a compulsory contribu-
tion to the support of the government-we can now turn to a discussion
of the repercussions of recharacterizing these measures as "taxes."
marriage. See id. at 31-33 (addressing the possible application to the federal DOMA
of Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), which struck down a Colorado constitu-
tional amendment on equal protection grounds because it was motivated by antigay
animus).
148. 1 BirKER & LOKKEN, supra note 139, 1 20.3.3 (explaining how the disallowance of
deductions for fines and penalties on grounds of frustration of public policy (now
codified at I.R.C. § 162(f) (2006)) does not merely preserve the sting of the fine or
penalty but rather acts as an additional tax penalty on the activity).
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Naturally, the power to tax is far from unlimited; after all, as is so
often repeated, "the power to tax involves the power to destroy."' 9 La-
beling the DOMAs "taxes" will therefore trigger the respective federal
and state constitutional restrictions on the power to tax.5 o In the first
section of this Part, I explore the restrictions on the imposition of "di-
rect" taxes contained in the federal constitution. A direct tax (other than
a tax on income) can pass constitutional muster only if it is apportioned
based on population. I argue that the federal DOMA is a direct tax on
property (i.e., on the store of legal rights and obligations associated with
a same-sex couple's marriage, civil union, or domestic partnership) that
fails to pass constitutional muster because Congress has not apportioned
that tax by population. In the second section of this Part, I explore the
"uniformity" requirement that appears in many state constitutions.
These uniformity clauses require, for example, that a state impose the
same tax on all property of the same character. I argue that the state
mini-DOMAs impose different taxes on property of the same character;
that is, I argue that the mini-DOMAs vary the tax rate on a couple's
property interest in the legal rights and obligations associated with their
marriage (or civil union or domestic partnership) depending on whether
the couple is of the same (or different) sex(es). Finally, in the event that
such constitutional challenges are unavailable or unavailing, I conclude
this Part with a discussion of how a robust notion of tax equity requires
this additional tax on lesbian and gay families to be taken into account
when determining the justness of the distribution of the overall tax bur-
den.
A. Apportionment ofDirect Taxes
On its face, the constitutional grant of taxing power to the federal
government appears plenary;"' however, that power is subject to limita-
tions. 5 2 On the one hand, the Uniformity Clause requires that "all
149. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 431 (1819).
150. For a sampling of other, nontax constitutional arguments for striking down the
DOMAs, see supra note 11.
151. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 ("The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States .... ).
152. See Jensen, Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, supra note 66, at 2339-40 ("Al-
though the power [to tax] has therefore been described as plenary, the Constitution
prescribes several limitations on that power." (citation omitted)); id. at 2389 ("[T]he
conventional wisdom that the taxing power was intended to be plenary, without sig-
nificant restrictions, is not supported by the historical evidence."); see also id. at
2345-50.
2010] 365
MICHIGAN JOURNAL OF GENDER & LAW
Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United
States."1" This clause "has been held to require only geographical uni-
formity: the standards that apply in one state must apply in all other
states as well."' On the other hand, two separate clauses of the U.S.
Constitution require the apportionment by population of all "direct"
taxes (other than income taxes).'" This apportionment requirement is a
more significant hurdle, because it "ties a state's share of the total direct-
tax liability to its share of the nation's population, measured using the
currently applicable census rules."' Indeed, "apportionment among the
states commonly turns out to be a silly requirement, 'absurd[] and ineq-
uitable,' which hobbles direct taxes and makes them impossible, in
*',l57practice, to use.
Erik Jensen has explained the relationship between the apportion-
ment and uniformity requirements as follows:
The uniformity and apportionment rules have quite different
focuses. Indeed, the two rules are set up to be mutually exclu-
sive: taxes other than direct taxes are not subject to the
apportionment requirement, and the uniformity rule cannot
apply to apportioned direct taxes. Under the case law, a levy is
governed by one rule or the other, but not both. The idea that
some levies might fall outside the scope of both rules-a pos-
sibility that was once taken seriously-has fallen by the
wayside.158
It will thus be necessary to determine whether the tax imposed by
the federal DOMA should be characterized as (1) a direct tax subject to
the apportionment requirement or (2) an indirect tax (to use the con-
153. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
154. Jensen, Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, supra note 66, at 2340.
155. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 ("Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to
their respective Numbers .... ) (amended 1868, 1913); id. § 9, cl. 4 ("No Capita-
tion, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or
enumeration herein before directed to be taken.") (amended 1913); see also id.
amend. XVI (exempting income taxes from this limitation).
156. Jensen, Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, supra note 66, at 2341.
157. Calvin H. Johnson, Apportionment of Direct Taxes: The Foul-up in the Core of the
Constitution, 7 Wm. & MARY BILL RTs. J. 1, 3 (1998) (quoting Hylton v. United
States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 179 (1796)).
158. Jensen, Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, supra note 66, at 2341; see also John-
son, supra note 157, at 55 ("Under a doctrine developed by the Supreme Court,
'excise taxes,' as well as the impost or customs duties, have been excluded from 'direct
tax,' so that they do not have to be apportioned.").
366 [Vol. 16:319
ventional shorthand for "Duties, Imposts and Excises") subject to the
uniformity rule. If it is an indirect tax, the federal DOMA will likely be
upheld because it applies on a geographically uniform basis throughout
the country. In contrast, if it is a direct tax, the federal DOMA will
likely be found unconstitutional because it is neither apportioned by
population nor a tax on income.
1. "Direct" Taxes
As historian Robin Einhorn has noted, "[a]lthough several of the
framers and a handful of the nation's early legislators proposed defini-
tions-and many lawyers, judges, and legal scholars have weighed in
over the two centuries since then-the question of whether any particu-
lar tax should be defined as a direct tax appears to remain open even
today.""' Nonetheless, Einhorn identifies taxes "on land, polls, slaves, or
property generally" as the ones "most likely to count as 'direct" at the
time the Constitution was drafted." 0 In fact, the Constitution itself makes
abundantly clear that a poll tax (also called a head or capitation tax) is a
direct tax, because it specifically applies the apportionment requirement
to "Capitation, or other direct, Tax[es].""' Early on, the Supreme Court
registered its understanding that real estate taxes are also direct taxes.
162
Later, in Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., the Supreme Court held
that personal property taxes are likewise direct taxes. 63 Although the
Sixteenth Amendment later overturned the Pollock Court's further hold-
ing that income taxes on real and personal property are derivatively
direct taxes, the Supreme Court has confirmed that the Sixteenth
Amendment did not disturb the classification of personal property taxes
as direct taxes.'" Moreover, on several occasions, the Supreme Court has
159. ROBIN L. EINHORN, AMERICAN TAXATION, AMERICAN SLAVERY 160 (2006).
160. Id. at 186.
161. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 4.
162. Hykon, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 175 (Chase, J.); 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) at 176 (Paterson, J.); 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) at 183 (Iredell, J.); see EINHORN, supra note 159, at 160; Jensen, Mean-
ing of "Incomes,"supra note 66, at 1069-70; see also Johnson, supra note 157, at 70
("Real estate taxes were the heart of the state tax systems at the time of the Constitu-
tion so that all speakers would have considered land taxes to be direct . . .
163. 158 U.S. 601, 628 (1895).
164.
[Ilt is to be observed that although from the date of the Hylton Case be-
cause of statements made in the opinions in that case it had come to be
accepted that direct taxes in the constitutional sense were confined to taxes
levied directly on real estate because of its ownership, the Amendment con-
tains nothing repudiating or challenging the ruling in the Pollock Case that
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reaffirmed the notion that taxes on the ownership of real and personal
property are direct taxes subject to the apportionment requirement. 161
Outside of these limited categories-and, in some cases, even with
regard to them'-there has been significant academic debate over the
the word direct had a broader significance, since it embraced also taxes lev-
ied directly on personal property because of its ownership, and therefore
the Amendment at least impliedly makes such wider significance a part of
the Constitution-a condition which clearly demonstrates that the purpose
was not to change the existing interpretation except to the extent necessary
to accomplish the result intended, that is, the prevention of the resort to
the sources from which a taxed income was derived in order to cause a di-
rect tax on the income to be a direct tax on the source itself and thereby to
take an income tax out of the class of excises, duties and imposts and place
it in the class of direct taxes.
Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 19 (1916).
Bruce Ackerman has suggested that, had the "New Deal Revolution" not so
quickly "swept aside the established constitutional understandings of the Lochner
era," the Supreme Court would have, in due course, overruled this interpretation of
the direct tax clauses. Bruce Ackerman, Taxation and the Constitution, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 46-47 (1999). Nonetheless, as the tense of the previous sentence clearly indi-
cates, this suggestion is nothing more than speculation about what might have
happened had history taken a different course.
165. Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 352 (1945) ("Congress may tax real estate or
chattels if the tax is apportioned, and without apportionment it may tax an excise
upon a particular use or enjoyment of property or the shifting from one to another of
any power or privilege incidental to the ownership or enjoyment of property.");
Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 136 (1929) ("While taxes levied upon or col-
lected from persons because of their general ownership of property may be taken to
be direct, this court has consistently held, almost from the foundation of the govern-
ment, that a tax imposed upon a particular use of property or the exercise of a single
power over property incidental to ownership, is an excise which need not be appor-
tioned ..... (citation omitted)); 280 U.S. at 139-40 (Sutherland, J. dissenting)
("Since the Pollock Case, however, we know that a tax on property, whether real or
personal, or upon the income derived therefrom, is direct; and that to levy a tax by
reason of ownership of property is to tax the property."); Knowlton v. Moore, 178
U.S. 41, 78-83 (1900) (holding that an inheritance tax was not a direct tax because it
was imposed upon the transfer of property at death and not merely on the ownership
or possession of property as such).
166. Ackerman, for example, has expressed a personal belief that the Supreme Court
should limit the application of the apportionment requirement to capitation
taxes-the only form of "direct" tax specifically mentioned in the text of the Con-
stitution-and repudiate the repeatedly reaffirmed understanding that real estate
taxes are likewise "direct" taxes. Ackerman, supra note 164, at 58. Ackerman urges
this repudiation because the apportionment requirement has its roots in the ac-
commodation of slavery, and "American law should leave no stone unturned in its
effort to root out any residue of its original compromise with slavery-and the 'di-
rect tax' clause is a small, but potentially damaging, stone." Id. Notwithstanding
Ackerman's laudable motivations, his proposed interpretation is profoundly an-
titextual, as it disregards the specific mention of "other" direct taxes in U.S.
368 [Vol. 16:319
distinction between direct and indirect taxes. Erik Jensen has argued
that "[d]irect taxes are taxes that are not indirect taxes and that are im-
posed by the national government directly on individuals, generally
without the states' serving as filters of the national power."1
67 According
to Jensen, indirect taxes are confined to duties, imposts, and excises im-
posed on articles of consumption. 68 In a later article, Jensen summed up
his thoughts on the difference between direct and indirect taxes as fol-
lows:
The founders understood indirect taxes, but not direct taxes,
to be "shiftable." The burden was assumed to fall on the ulti-
mate purchaser: even if the seller is legally obligated to remit
the tax, the price paid will have the tax embedded in it. In
contrast, direct taxes (subject to apportionment) are imposed
directly on individuals who are expected to bear the burden of
the taxes.6
Calvin Johnson has taken issue with Jensen's interpretation of the
direct tax clauses, asserting that the evidence in support of Jensen's read-
ing is conflicting and that "[o]ptimal tax policy in the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries should not be governed by reading tea leaves or
looking to such isolated eighteenth century usages." 7 1 Johnson proffers
instead what he describes as a "functional[], but ahistorical[]" approach
to defining direct taxes.' 7' He would interpret the term to apply only "to
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4. In addition, Ackerman misses the extent to which the ac-
commodation of slavery permeated the structure of our early tax system (being far
from confined to the direct tax clauses) as well as the ways in which it continues to
influence how we think about taxation. See generally EINHORN, supra note 159; see
also generally Anthony C. Infanti, Tax as Urban Legend, 24 HARv. BLACKLETTER L.J.
229 (2008) (reviewing EINHORN, supra note 159). Furthermore, Ackerman does not
even contemplate the possibility, broached in this Article, of reclaiming the tainted
direct tax clauses for the purpose of fighting-rather than fostering-oppression.
167. Jensen, Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, supra note 66, at 2402.
168. Id. at 2394-95.
169. Jensen, Meaning of "Incomes," supra note 66, at 1075.
170. Johnson, supra note 157, at 67-70. Jensen responds to Johnson in Erik M. Jensen,
Interpreting the Sixteenth Amendment (By Way of the Direct-Tax Clauses), 21 CONST.
COMMENT. 355 (2004). The two also took their debate to the pages of Tax Notes. See
Erik M. Jensen, The Constitution Matters in Taxation, 100 TAX NOTES 821 (2003);
Erik M. Jensen, Jensen's Response to Johnson's Response to Jensen's Response to Johnson's
Response to Jensen (or Is It the Other Way Around?), 100 TAx NOTES 841 (2003); Cal-
vin H. Johnson, Barbie Dolls in the Archeological Dig: Professor Johnson Responds, 100
TAx NOTES 832 (2003); Calvin H. Johnson, Purging out Pollock.- The Constitutional-
ity of Federal Wealth or Sales Tax, 97 TAX NOTES 1723 (2002).
171. Johnson, supra note 157, at 71.
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head taxes and requisitions from the several states, but nothing else." 7 2
Under Johnson's reading of the Constitution:
Apportionment should be required when it is reasonable and
convenient, but not when apportionment would lead to per-
verse results. Apportionment would never make any kind of
tax impossible, and Congress would then have plenary power
over the subject and manner of federal tax, as the Framers
originally intended. The definition preserves the grand pur-
poses of the Constitution and prevents absurdity, sloughing off
only a silly requirement. 1 3
Johnson grounds this reading of the apportionment requirement in
applications of the legal maxim ejusdem generis and the doctrine of cy
pres. He also relies on a similar reading by the Supreme Court in its
first decision addressing the apportionment requirement, Hylton v.
United States, which was decided in 1796 by a court populated with
framers and those influential in the ratification debates.'75
Bruce Ackerman arrives at much the same interpretation as John-
son, albeit by a different route. 76 Ackerman similarly proposes a return
to a more limited construction of the phrase "direct tax."' 77 He grounds
his proposal in the fact that the direct tax clauses "do not represent an
independent judgment about the proper system for direct taxation, but
were part and parcel of a larger compromise over slavery at the Philadel-
phia Convention. "7 In view of the Reconstruction Amendments'
repudiation of the "nation's bargain with slavery,"'79 Ackerman, like
Johnson, advocates a return to the restrained interpretation of the direct
tax clauses found in the Supreme Court's decision in Hylton.180
172. Id.
173. Id. For a description of how the apportionment requirement can lead to perverse
results, see id. at 5-12.
174. Id at 72, 78.
175. Id. at 73-77.
176. Ackerman, supra note 164, at 2 n.1; see id. at 15 n.50 (describing the ways in which
Ackerman parts company with Johnson's interpretation of the phrase "direct tax").
Jensen responds to Ackerman in Erik M. Jensen, Taxation and the Constitution: How
to Read the Direct Tax Clauses, 15 J.L. & POL. 687 (1999).
177. Ackerman, supra note 164, at 56-58.
178. Id. at 4; see id. at 7-13 (describing the origins of the direct tax clauses).
179. Id. at 25.
180. Id. at 58. Ackerman advocates this approach in connection with his defense of a
wealth tax proposal that he had formulated with Anne Alstott. As mentioned supra
note 166, on a personal level, Ackerman actually goes further and advocates an even
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Most recently, Joseph Dodge has entered this debate.'8 Dodge dif-
fers in his views from Jensen, Johnson, and Ackerman. Contrary to
Johnson and Ackerman, Dodge maintains that the direct tax clauses still
have vitality.182 And staking out a position in between Jensen and John-
son, Dodge contends that the direct tax clauses apply only to
requisitions from the states, capitation taxes, and taxes on real property
and tangible personal property.' Though Dodge acknowledges that
current case law also includes taxes on intangible personal property
within the scope of the direct tax clauses, he argues that taxes on intan-
gible personal property should not be considered direct taxes because the
phrase "direct tax" should be construed to apply only to taxes on items
that have a fixed geographical location, which intangibles do not.
2. DOMA as a Direct Tax
Fortunately, we can skirt this stimulating academic debate over the
most appropriate interpretation of the direct tax clauses. The focus of
my analysis here is not on whether Jensen, Johnson, Ackerman, or
Dodge is correct, but on developing a position that can be credibly ad-
vanced in litigation contesting the constitutionality of the federal
DOMA. Naturally, such a position is better grounded in the established
judicial understanding of the scope of the direct tax clauses than in aca-
demic debates that have thus far eluded a clear resolution of the
question.
As mentioned above,'18 the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaf-
firmed the notion that taxes on the ownership of real or personal
property are direct taxes. What I will suggest here is that the federal
DOMA operates, in essence, as a tax on the ownership of property and,
therefore, should be classified as a direct tax under this line of cases.
Marriage, civil unions, and domestic partnerships are most com-
monly viewed as contractual relationships.8 6 Nevertheless, contractual
more limited interpretation of the direct tax clauses under Hylton. For criticism of
that position, see the discussion supra note 166.
181. Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal Taxes Are Subject to the Rule ofApportionment Under
the Constitution? (2008), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1311957.
182. Id. at 4 4 -53.
183. Id. at 3, 53.
184. Id. at 53, 56-63.
185. See supra notes 162-165 and accompanying text.
186. Eg., ALA. CODE § 30-1-19(c) (2008) ("Marriage is a sacred covenant, solemnized
between a man and a woman, which, when the legal capacity and consent of both
parties is present, establishes their relationship as husband and wife, and which is rec-
ognized by the state as a civil contract."); AtsKA STAT. § 25.05.011(a) (2007)
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and property interests are not incompatible; in fact, contracts can-and
do-give rise to property rights. For example, my status as a tenured
professor of law at the University of Pittsburgh arises out of my em-
ployment contract with the university. Yet, the courts "have recognized
that tenured professors at public universities hold a property interest in
their tenure" for purposes of the federal constitutional guarantee of due
process of law.181
("Marriage is a civil contract entered into by one man and one woman that requires
both a license and solemnization."); CAL. FAM. CODE § 420(c) (2008) ("No contract
of marriage, if otherwise duly made, shall be invalidated for want of conformity to
the requirements of any religious sect."); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-38mm (2008)
("All civil unions in which one or both parties are citizens of this state, celebrated in a
foreign country, shall be valid, provided: (1) Each party would have legal capacity to
contract such civil union in this state and the civil union is celebrated in conformity
with the law of that country. . . ."); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3- 2 (a) (2007) ("To be able
to contract marriage, a person must . . . ."); HAW. REv. STAT. § 572-1 (2007) ("In
order to make valid the marriage contract, which shall be only between a man and a
woman, it shall be necessary that .. . ."); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 32-201(1) (2007)
("Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between a man and a
woman .... "); IOWA CODE § 595.1A (2007) ("Marriage is a civil contract .... ");
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 2 3-101(a) (2006) ("The marriage contract is to be considered in
law as a civil contract between two parties who are of opposite sex."); LA. CIv. CODE
ANN. art. 87 (2008) ("The requirements for the contract of marriage are . . . .");
MICH. COMP. LAws § 551.2 (2008) ("marriage is a civil contract between a man and
a woman"); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 122.010(1) (2007) ("Marriage, so far as its va-
lidity in law is concerned, is a civil contract .... ); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-03-01
(2007) ("Marriage is a personal relation arising out of a civil contract between one
man and one woman . . . ."); N.J. REv. STAT. ANN. § 37:1-7 (2008) ("The licensing
officer is hereby empowered to issue marriage or civil union licenses to the contract-
ing parties . . . ."); OR. REV. STAT. § 106.010 (2007) ("Marriage is a civil contract
.... "); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. § 1102 (2007) ("'MARRIAGE.' A civil contract by
which one man and one woman take each other for husband and wife."); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 26.04.010(1) (2008) ("Marriage is a civil contract . . . ."); Wis.
STAT. § 765.001(2) (2007) ("The consequences of the marriage contract are more
significant to society than those of other contracts, and the public interest must be
taken into account always."); Or. Laws Adv. Sh. No. 99, § 3(1) (effective Jan. 1,
2008) ("'DOMESTIC PARTNERSHIP' MEANS A CIVIL CONTRACT
ENTERED INTO IN PERSON BETWEEN TWO INDIVIDUALS OF THE
SAME SEX WHO ARE AT LEAST 18 YEARS OF AGE, WHO ARE
OTHERWISE CAPABLE AND AT LEAST ONE OF WHOM IS A RESIDENT
OF OREGON.").
187. Univ. of Pittsburgh v. United States, 507 F.3d 165, 176 (3d Cir. 2007) (Scirica, J.
dissenting) (federal tax dispute over whether early buy-out payments constituted
FICA "wages" or were made in exchange for property rights in tenure); see Perry v.
Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601 (1972) ("A written contract with an explicit tenure
provision clearly is evidence of a formal understanding that supports a teacher's claim
of entitlement to continued employment unless sufficient 'cause' is shown. Yet ab-
sence of such an explicit contractual provision may not always foreclose the
possibility that a teacher has a 'property' interest in re-employment."); 408 U.S. at
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Similarly, once contracted, a marriage, civil union, or domestic
partnership gives rise to a whole host of legal rights and obligations,
both within the couple and vis-h-vis the state and third parties. For ex-
ample, a surviving spouse's right to an elective share of a deceased
spouse's estate embodies both a legal right in the surviving spouse to a
certain portion of the decedent's estate and a legal obligation on the part
of the decedent to provide for the surviving spouse following death. 188
Spousal immunity from testifying in court embodies both a legal right
in spouses not to be forced to testify against each other and a legal obli-
gation on the part of the state not to invade the privacy of legally
recognized unions. Tenancies by the entirety may embody both a legal
right in the spouses to hold property free of claims of their individual
creditors and a legal obligation on the part of those creditors to look
elsewhere for payment." These are but a few examples of the numerous
603-04 (Burger, J. concurring) ("The Court holds today only that a state-employed
teacher who has a right to re-employment under state law, arising from either an ex-
press or implied contract, has, in turn, a right guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment to some form of prior administrative or academic hearing on the
cause for nonrenewal of his contract."); N.D. State Univ. v. United States, 255 F.3d
599, 605 (8th Cir. 2001) (in the context of holding that early buy-out payments to
tenured professors were made in exchange for property and contractual rights and
were not wages for tax purposes, stating: "The parties agree that tenure is a protected
property right. In this circuit, a tenured professor at a state institution not only has a
constitutional right to procedural due process, but also has 'a substantive due process
right to be free from discharge for reasons that are "arbitrary and capricious," or in
other words, for reasons that are trivial, unrelated to the education process, or wholly
unsupported by a basis in fact."').
188. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: WILLS AND OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS
§ 9.1 cmt.b (2003) ("The purpose of the elective share is to grant the decedent's sur-
viving spouse an appropriate protection against being disinherited. The prevailing
view of marriage is that it is an economic partnership, which imports a goal of equal-
izing the marital assets.").
189. See 3 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 505.03 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed.
2009) (describing two distinct marital privileges that exist under the Federal Rules of
Evidence).
190.
[T]he advent of mutual control prompted protection of both spouses' in-
terests and consequent denial of creditor access to either spouse's interest.
In a few other states, a spouse's individual interest is subject to levy and
execution. A purchaser of such an interest at an execution sale becomes a
tenant in common with the other spouse, but with no right to force parti-
tion. A few states permit creditors of either spouse to satisfy debts out of
the entirety, thus severing it and destroying the right of survivorship. In
still other states, the common law prevails such that a judgment entered
against a husband or wife individually does not give rise to a valid lien
against property held as tenants by the entirety.
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legal rights and obligations that are associated with marriage, civil un-
ions, and domestic partnerships and that affect the spouses, the state,
and third parties.'9'
Taken together, the sundry legal rights and obligations associated
with marriage, civil unions, and domestic partnerships are much like the
bundle of rights (and the obligations that go with them) that compose
every piece of property, whether real or personal, tangible or intangi-
ble.' 92 With respect to tangible property, among the most commonly
mentioned rights in this bundle are the powers to possess the property,
to use it, to exclude others from it, and to alienate it.'" Although the
rights (and obligations) associated with marriage, civil unions, and do-
mestic partnerships are not a form of tangible property, one can detect
in these rights (and obligations) analogous powers to possess the prop-
erty, to use it, to exclude others from it, and to alienate it.'9 4 For
example, the spouses have the power to use this property; that is, to en-
joy the many legal benefits accorded to their relationship. As evidenced
by the discussion in the previous paragraph of spousal immunity from
testifying in court and tenancies by the entirety, the spouses likewise
have the power to exclude others (whether the state or third parties)
from their relationship. Furthermore, the spouses are able to relinquish
or compromise (i.e., alienate) certain of the legal rights that attend their
marital status (e.g., through prenuptial agreements).'" Moreover, the
spouses are the only ones who can relinquish their marital status by pur-
suing dissolution of their relationship.
Some may recoil at the thought of labeling the store of legal rights
and obligations associated with marriage, civil unions, and domestic
partnerships as a form of property. After all, marriage has a well-known
history as a highly patriarchal institution:
7 RIcHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 52.03[3] (Patrick J. Rohan
rev. ed., 2006) (footnotes omitted).
191. For further examples, see supra text accompanying note 121. In addition, as men-
tioned supra text accompanying note 43, there are more than one thousand federal
statutes in which marital status is a factor in the determination of legal rights, bene-
fits, and privileges.
192. See generally Goutam U. Jois, Note, Marital Status as Property: Toward a New Juris-
prudence for Gay Rights, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 509 (2006) (arguing that
marital status and the legal rights and obligations associated with marriage should
both be considered a form of property for purposes of the Fifth Amendment's Tak-
ings Clause).
193. See, e.g., Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 170 (1998); Loretto v. Tele-
prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435-36 (1982).
194. See Jois, supra note 192, at 538.
195. See, e.g., UNIFORM PREMARTTAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3.
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By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that
is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended
during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consoli-
dated into that of the husband; under whose wing, protection,
and cover, she performs everything .. . . Upon this principle,
of an union of person in husband and wife, depend almost all
the legal rights, duties, and disabilities, that either of them ac-
* * 196quire by the marriage.
For this reason, I would like to clarify that I am not asserting here that
either spouse becomes the property of the other upon marriage or upon
entering into a civil union or domestic partnership. Rather, I am arguing
that each spouse has a property interest in the store of legal rights and
obligations associated with the marriage, civil union, or domestic part-
nership. Characterizing the sum of these legal rights and obligations as a
form of property is not the same thing as saying that either spouse is the
property of the other. To return to the tenure example above, no one
would argue either that I am the property of the University of Pitts-
burgh or that the University of Pittsburgh is my property simply because
the university's grant of tenure under the terms of my employment con-
tract has given rise to a protectable property interest.
As a tax, the federal DOMA-taken in conjunction with the state
mini-DOMAs that it encourages, facilitates, and feeds off ofX -falls
squarely on the spouses' property interest in the legal rights (and obliga-
tions) associated with their marriage, civil union, or domestic
partnership. The incidence of this tax on lesbian and gay families be-
comes clear upon considering the effect of nonpayment of the tax on the
couple and their children. If a couple refuses-or, more likely, simply
cannot afford-to pay the tax (i.e., if the couple refuses-or cannot af-
ford-to draft the necessary legal documents and undertake the required
legal proceedings for the recognition of their relationship with each
other and their children), then the federal government (in complicity
with the states that have mini-DOMAs) essentially "forecloses" on those
196. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 442 (Wayne
Morrison ed. 2001) (citations omitted); see POLIKOFF, supra note 126, at 12-15.
197. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2008) (permitting states to refuse to recognize same-sex
marriages celebrated in other states). The federal DOMA feeds off of the state mini-
DOMAs because federal law often turns on the application of state law. For example,
for federal tax purposes, the tax consequences of (1) familial relationships and (2)
property transactions usually turn on the state law treatment of those relationships
and transactions. If a same-sex couple's relationship is not legally recognized for either
of these state law purposes, then it will not be recognized for federal tax purposes ei-
ther. See Cain, supra note 59, at 389-406.
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legal relationships, extinguishing the couple's legal rights and obligations
(not to mention their children's legal rights) in much the same way that
the government extinguishes a property owner's legal rights and obliga-
tions in property when property taxes are delinquent. As a tax on the
ownership of property, the federal DOMA should therefore be classified
as a "direct" tax and subjected to the constitutional requirement of ap-
portionment on the basis of population-a constitutional requirement
that it clearly cannot satisfy as its effects are concentrated in those states
that legally recognize same-sex relationships.
The federal DOMA can find no refuge from the constitutional
dustbin in the Sixteenth Amendment's exemption from the apportion-
ment requirement for taxes on income. To borrow a phrase from the
U.S. Supreme Court in Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., the legal
rights and obligations associated with marriage and its legal equivalents
are no more "undeniable accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over
which the taxpayers have complete dominion""" than are the right to
vote, the right to freedom of speech, the right to interstate travel, or any
other fundamental right protected by the U.S. Constitution."'
Equally unavailing is the argument that the DOMAs are a tax on
income because they must be paid, directly or indirectly, out of the
same-sex couple's income. As Erik Jensen has explained with regard to
his work on the constitutionality of consumption taxes:
One reader argued that all taxes are effectively income taxes in
that they will almost always be paid, directly or indirectly, out
of taxpayers' income....
At some level, that proposition may be plausible economically,
but it can have no force as a constitutional argument. The Six-
teenth Amendment was a response to Pollock, not an attempt
to validate all conceivable revenue devices. If the framers of the
Sixteenth Amendment intended to eliminate all constitutional
limitations on the taxing power other than the Uniformity
Clause, they picked extraordinarily inefficient language to do
200SO.
198. 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955).
199. 2 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 107, § 15.7; 3 id. § 17.4(c); 4 id. %§ 18.31, 18.40.
200. Jensen, Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional?, supra note 66, at 2413; cf Tucker v.
United States, 83-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9308 (W.D. Tex. 1983) (rejecting a
challenge to the federal income tax's marriage penalty under the direct tax clauses on
the ground that the federal income tax rate schedules are "reasonably related to the
constitutional objective of the Sixteenth Amendment").
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Indeed, I would go further and assert that this argument proves en-
tirely too much to be taken seriously. For instance, it strains credulity to
argue that the federal excise taxes on gasoline, tobacco, and alcohol and
the federal estate and gift taxes are all "income taxes" merely because
they may be paid out of the taxpayer's income.201 In fact, one need not
have "income" to incur (or, for that matter, to pay) any of these taxes at
all. For example, someone with no job or other source of income but
who has non-income-producing, nonappreciated property and a set of
credit cards or a line of credit secured by that property 20 2 could still pur-
chase gasoline, tobacco, and/or alcohol-and incur and pay the
associated excise taxes-all without "income," because, under the gener-
ally accepted understanding of "income" for federal income tax
purposes, borrowed funds are not considered income due to the offset-
ting obligation to repay (and the use of nonappreciated property to
satisfy a debt would not give rise to income either).203 In addition, an
individual with no job or other source of income but who holds a great
deal of non-income-producing, nonappreciated property would be liable
for estate and/or gift tax upon its transfer. That property could be sold
to pay the tax, but without giving rise to any "income" in the accepted
federal income tax sense. Failing payment by the transferor, the tax
would be levied on the transferee, but that tax would, in essence, be
taken only out of the transferred property (and only to the extent of the
property's value at the time of transfer) and not out of "income. 204
Likewise, one can become liable for (and even pay) the taxes imposed by
the DOMAs without having any income at all. Attorneys, ancillary ser-
vice providers, and courts are all normally ambivalent about the source
of payment for their fees and charges-they do not care whether it
comes from borrowed money; the proceeds of selling nonappreciated
property; or wages, dividends, or interest-just so long as they are paid.
Viewed from this perspective, then, the federal DOMA is an un-
constitutional tax on lesbian and gay families because it is an
unapportioned direct tax on their property interests in the legal rights
(and obligations) associated with their marriages, civil unions, and do-
mestic partnerships.
201. See I.R.C. %§ 2001, 2501, 4081, 5001, 5041, 5051, 5701 (2008).
202. This may be less far-fetched than it sounds: just think of an unemployed victim of
subprime lending who has now lost her only source of income and, in the wake of the
real estate bubble's burst, is sitting on a home whose value has dipped significantly
below the amount she paid for it.
203. 1 BrrrKER & LOKKEN, supra note 139, 117.1.
204. I.R.C. %§ 2002, 2502(c), 6324 (2008).
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B. State Constitution Uniformity Clauses
As of this writing, forty-one states have enacted some form of a
mini-DOMA. Of these states, twelve have only a statutory prohibition
against same-sex marriage, three have only a constitutional prohibition
against same-sex marriage, and twenty-six have both a statutory and a
constitutional prohibition against same-sex marriage.205 Thirty-five of
these forty-one states with mini-DOMAs also have some form of a pro-
vision in their constitutions that requires some or all of the state's taxes
to be imposed uniformly.206 Given that the mini-DOMAs do not im-
205. See supra note 16.
206. See ALA. CONST. art. XI, § 217(b) ("With respect to ad valorem taxes levied by the
state, all taxable property shall be forever taxed at the same rate." The language "taxed
at the same rate" has been interpreted to mean "uniformity in taxation," see State v.
Deaton, Inc., 355 So. 2d 378, 380 (Ala. Civ. App. 1978); Aiz. CONsT. art. IX, § 1
("all taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property within the territorial lim-
its of the authority levying the tax"); ARK. CONST. art. XVI, § 5(a) ("All real and
tangible personal property subject to taxation shall be taxed according to its value,
that value to be ascertained in such manner as the General Assembly shall direct,
making the same equal and uniform throughout the State. No one species of property
for which a tax may be collected shall be taxed higher than another species of prop-
erty of equal value, except as provided and authorized in Section 15 of this article,
and except as authorized in Section 14 of this article."); CAL. CONST., art. IV, § 16(a)
("All laws of a general nature have uniform operation."); id. art. XIII, § 1(a) ("All
property is taxable and shall be assessed at the same percentage of fair market value.");
COLO. CONST. art. X, § 3(1)(a) ("Each property tax levy shall be uniform upon all
real and personal property not exempt from taxation under this article located within
the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax."); DEL. CONST. art. VIII, § 1
("All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial lim-
its of the authority levying the tax . . . ."); FLA. CONsT. art. VII, § 2 ("All ad valorem
taxation shall be at a uniform rate within each taxing unit, except the taxes on intan-
gible personal property may be at different rates but shall never exceed two mills on
the dollar of assessed value . . . ."); GA. CONST. art. VII, § I, para. 3(a) ("Except as
otherwise provided ... ,all taxation shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects
within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax."); IDAHO CONST. art. VII,
§ 5 ("All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects within the territorial
limits, of the authority levying the tax . . . provided, that the legislature may allow
such exemptions from taxation from time to time as shall seem necessary and just
.... "); ILL. CONST. art. IX, §§ 2 ("In any law classifying the subjects or objects of
non-property taxes or fees, the classes shall be reasonable and the subjects and objects
within each class shall be taxed uniformly."), 4(a) ("taxes upon real property shall be
levied uniformly by valuation"); IND. CONST. art. 10, § 1(a) ("The General Assembly
shall provide, by law, for a uniform and equal rate of property assessment and taxa-
tion and shall prescribe regulations to secure a just valuation for taxation of all
property, both real and personal."); KAN. CONST. art. 11, § 1(a) ("Except as otherwise
hereinafter specifically provided, the legislature shall provide for a uniform and equal
basis of valuation and rate of taxation of all property subject to taxation."); Ky.
CONsT. § 171 ("Taxes shall be levied and collected for public purposes only and shall
378 [Vol. 16:319
TAXING CIVIL RIGHTS GAINS
pose a tax uniformly on all married couples (or their legal equivalent, in
be uniform upon all property of the same class subject to taxation within the territo-
rial limits of the authority levying the tax . . . ."); LA. CONST. art. VII, %§ 4 ("Equal
and uniform taxes may be levied on net incomes .... ."), 18(A) ("Property subject to
ad valorem taxation shall be listed on the assessment rolls at its assessed valuation,
which . . . shall be a percentage of its fair market value. The percentage of fair market
value shall be uniform throughout the state upon the same class of property."); MD.
CONsT. Declaration of Rights art. XV ("[A]ll taxes thereafter provided to be levied by
the State for the support of the general State Government, and by the Counties and
by the City of Baltimore for their respective purposes, shall be uniform within each
class or sub-class of land, improvements on land and personal property which the re-
spective taxing powers may have directed to be subjected to the tax levy . . . .");
MicH. CONsT. art. IX, § 3 ("The legislature shall provide for the uniform general ad
valorem taxation of real and tangible personal property not exempt by law except for
taxes levied for school operating purposes .... Every tax other than the general ad
valorem property tax shall be uniform upon the class or classes on which it oper-
ates."); MINN. CONsT. art. X, § 1 ("Taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of
subjects .... ); Miss. CONsT. art. IV, § 112 ("Taxation shall be uniform and equal
throughout the State."); Mo. CoNsT. art. X, § 3 ("Taxes ... shall be uniform upon
the same class or subclass of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levy-
ing the tax."); NEB. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("Taxes uniform as to class of property or
the ownership or use thereof may be levied by valuation or otherwise upon classes of
intangible property as the Legislature may determine .... ); NEV. CONST. art. 10,
§ 1, cl. 1 ("The legislature shall provide by law for a uniform and equal rate of as-
sessment and taxation .... ); N.C. CONST. art. V, § 2, para. 2 ("No class of property
shall be taxed except by uniform rule, and every classification shall be made by gen-
eral law uniformly applicable in every county, city and town, and other unit of local
government."); N.D. CONST. art. X, § 5 ("Taxes shall be uniform upon the same
class of property .... ); OKA. CONsT. art. X, § 5(b) ("Taxes shall be uniform upon
the same class of subjects."); OR. CONST. art. I, § 32 ("all taxation shall be uniform
on the same class of subjects within the territorial limits of the authority levying the
tax"); PA. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 ("All taxes shall be uniform, upon the same class of
subjects, within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax .... "); S.C.
CONsT. art. X, § 1 ("The General Assembly may provide for the ad valorem taxation
by the State or any of its subdivisions of all real and personal property. The assess-
ment of all property shall be equal and uniform . . . ."); S.D. CONsT. art. VI, § 17
("all taxation shall be equal and uniform"); TENN. CONST. art. II, § 28 ("The ratio of
assessment to value of property in each class or subclass shall be equal and uniform
throughout the State .. .. Each respective taxing authority shall apply the same tax
rate to all property within its jurisdiction."); TEx. CONST. art. VIII, § 1(a) ("Taxation
shall be equal and uniform."); VA. CONST. art. X, § 1 ("All taxes shall be levied and
collected under general laws and shall be uniform upon the same class of subjects
within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax .... ); WASH. CONST. art.
VII, § 1 ("All taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of property within the terri-
torial limits of the authority levying the tax . . . ."); W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1
("taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State"); Wis. CONsT. art. VIII,
§ 1 ("The rule of taxation shall be uniform .... ); WYo. CONsT. art. XV, § 11(d)
("All taxation shall be equal and uniform within each class of property.").
For a discussion of how such uniformity clauses are rooted in the accommoda-
tion of slavery, see EINHORN, supra note 159, at 202-11, 230-50.
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the case of couples who have entered into a civil union or domestic
partnership), the mini-DOMAs in these thirty-five states may be suscep-
tible to a constitutional challenge based on this common restriction on
state taxing power.
Among these thirty-five states, those with mini-DOMAs that are
purely statutory in nature are the most clearly susceptible to a state con-
stitutional law challenge to their validity on uniformity grounds,
because, in the event of a conflict between a state constitutional provi-
sion and a state statute, the constitutional provision must prevail. In
those states with a constitutional mini-DOMA, a challenge will be more
difficult-though not impossible-to mount. Naturally, given the nov-
elty of the argument being put forth here as well as the variety in the
type of mini-DOMA(s) a state has adopted and in the text and interpre-
tation of the various uniformity clauses in state constitutions, an
exhaustive discussion of how to formulate a challenge in all thirty-five of
these states is beyond the scope of this Article.207 Instead, I have chosen
to focus on the uniformity clause in the Arizona Constitution as an il-
lustrative example of how to formulate a uniformity clause challenge.
Arizona is a good example because it now has both a constitutional and
a statutory mini-DOMA. Thus, by using Arizona as an example, I will
be able to address both (1) how to overcome the conflict between a
more recently enacted constitutional prohibition against same-sex mar-
riage and an earlier uniformity clause and (2) the type of constitutional
challenge that might be made to a mini-DOMA (whether constitu-
tional, statutory, or both) based on the requirement that taxation must
be uniform throughout a state.
1. Overcoming the Constitutional Conflict
In November 2008, the voters of Arizona passed Proposition 102,
which added the following sentence to the state constitution: "Only a
union of one man and one woman shall be valid or recognized as a mar-
riage in this state."208 The uniformity clause of the Arizona Constitution,
which predates the passage of Proposition 102, provides that "all taxes
shall be uniform upon the same class of property within the territorial
limits of the authority levying the tax."209 If, as described more fully be-
207. For a brief overview of the types of questions to consider when formulating a uni-
formity clause challenge in other states, see Steve R. Johnson, Uniformity Clause
Limitations on State Taxes, ABA SEC. TAX'N NEWS Q., Spring 2008, at 12, 12-13.
208. AIUZ. CONST. art. XXX, § 1; see McKinley & Goodstein, supra note 16.
209. ARIz. CONsT. art. IX, § 1.
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low, these two provisions conflict, then it will be necessary to address the
question of how to resolve this conflict. In other words, should the later-
enacted mini-DOMA simply trump the earlier uniformity clause in the
Arizona Constitution?
It has been suggested that all constitutional norms may not be cre-
ated equal-that there may actually be a hierarchy of constitutional
norms based on the democratic legitimacy of their source.210 Focusing
on the U.S. Constitution, Carlos Gonzilez has argued that federal con-
stitutional norms emanating from government institutions (e.g.,
amendments to the U.S. Constitution that are proposed by Congress
and ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures) are of a lesser hier-
archical order than constitutional norms emanating from "we the
people" (e.g., the original U.S. Constitution and the Bill of Rights), be-
cause legislatures are of lesser democratic legitimacy than the popular
sovereign. 2 11 This means that "constitutional norms sourced in We the
People [should] be immune from repeal by later-in-time created truly
conflicting constitutional norms sourced in ordinary government insti-
.,212tutions.
An analogous argument can be made at the state level. In Arizona,
amendments to the state constitution may be initiated either by (1) a
bare majority of both houses of the state legislature or (2) "initiative pe-
tition signed by a number of qualified electors equal to fifteen per
centum of the total number of votes for all candidates for governor at
the last preceding general election. 2 13 Any amendment, whether initi-
ated by the legislature or by petition, must be approved by a majority of
214
the state's voters. Notwithstanding the ultimate need for voter ap-
proval, one could argue that amendments initiated by the state
legislature are of lesser democratic legitimacy than those initiated by the
voters themselves. In total, there are ninety members in the Arizona leg-
islature (thirty senators and sixty representatives), meaning that forty-
seven legislators can put a constitutional amendment on the ballot.215 In
contrast, for an amendment initiated by petition to qualify for the 2008
ballot, the signatures of 230,047 voters were required. 2 16 Given this huge
210. See Carlos E. Gonzilez, Popular Sovereign Generated Versus Government Institution
Generated Constitutional Norms: When Does a Constitutional Amendment Not Amend
the Constitution?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 127 (2002).
211. Id. at 130-33.
212. Id. at 164; see also id. at 225-28.
213. ARIz. CONST. art. XXI, 5 1.
214. Id.
215. Id. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1(1).
216. See ARIZONA SECRETARY OF STATE, STATE OF ARIZONA OFFICIAL CANvAss: 2006
GENERAL ELECTION, (2006), available at http://www.azsos.gov/election/200
6/
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disparity in the number of people needed to put a proposed amendment
before the voters and the potential for agency problems when the legisla-
ture, in the place of the voters, acts to initiate the amendment process, it
could be argued that constitutional amendments initiated by the legisla-
ture are of lesser democratic legitimacy than, and therefore should be
hierarchically subordinate to, both the core text of the state constitution
and amendments initiated by the voters.2"
In the case of Proposition 102, this argument is only strengthened
by several additional factors. First, the legislature "struggled to get
[Proposition 102] through each chamber."2 18 Second, an ethics com-
plaint was lodged against the state senator who abruptly terminated a
filibuster of the proposed constitutional amendment by simply shutting
off the filibustering senators' microphones. 219 Third, the Arizona voters
rejected a "marriage" amendment to the state constitution just two years
earlier.220 Finally, initiatives on social issues (e.g., same-sex marriage) are
often placed on the ballot for reasons unrelated to their ostensible pur-
poses.221 Accordingly, one might plausibly argue that the uniformity
clause of the Arizona Constitution is immune from the effects of Propo-
sition 102 because the uniformity clause emanated from "we the people"
(in fact, this clause was included in the original Arizona Constitution
adopted at the time of statehood) while Proposition 102 emanated from
the state legislature under questionable circumstances.
General/Canvass2006GE.pdf (indicating that 1,533,645 votes were cast for governor
in that election; 15% of that number is 230,047).
217. See Gonzalez, supra note 210, at 198-99 ("Principal-agent relationships cannot avoid
situations where the agent fails to do that which the principal wants done, acts before
the principal is prepared to act, or even engages in self-dealing behavior against the
interests or desires of the principal."); see also id. at 208 ("Party politics, rather than a
popular consensus favoring presidential term limits, was the major impetus for pro-
posing the Twenty-second Amendment.").
218. Amanda J. Crawford, Weighing Same-Sex Marriage, ARIz. REPUBLIC, July 13, 2008,
Valley & State at 3.
219. Amanda J. Crawford, Ethics Panel to Investigate Senator Who Ended Debate, ARIz.
REPUBLIC, July 29, 2008, Valley & State at 3 (senator under investigation); Amanda
J. Crawford, Ethics Complaint Against Senator Dismissed, ARiz. REPUBLIC, Aug. 13,
2008, Valley & State at 8 (complaint dismissed in what one elected official called a
"whitewash").
220. Amanda J. Crawford, Campaign Proposing Ban on Same-Sex Marriage Concedes De-
feat, ARiz. REPUBLIC, Nov. 16, 2006, Valley & State at 1.
221. See Ian Urbina, Social Initiatives on State Ballots Could Draw Attention to Presidential
Race, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2008, at A12 ("[M]any of the social measures on the bal-
lots are being pushed by evangelical groups that hope to force Senator John McCain
of Arizona, the presumptive Republican presidential nominee, to pay closer attention
to their agenda.").
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2. The Uniformity Clause Challenge
With the question raised by the constitutional conflict addressed,
we can now turn to the substance of the uniformity clause challenge that
can be made to a mini-DOMA (whether constitutional or statutory in
nature). As mentioned above, the uniformity clause of the Arizona Con-
stitution provides that "all taxes shall be uniform upon the same class of
property within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax."
222
The Arizona Supreme Court has held that this clause "imposes greater
limits on state taxing authorities than the federal equal protection
clause." 223 Nevertheless, the uniformity clause does permit the legislature
to classify property and to tax property at different rates; however, "the
legislature may not unfairly and unreasonably discriminate 'between
taxpayers of the same class, or be arbitrary, specious, or fanciful.' ,224 Ac-
cordingly, all classifications must be reasonable and based on real
differences between the classes of property, which necessarily "means
that property of the same character must be taxed the same.
225
In America West Airlines, Inc. v. Department ofRevenue, the Arizona
Supreme Court considered a uniformity clause challenge to a rate cap
that applied only to certain property subject to an ad valorem flight
property tax.226 The rate cap applied to "the flight property of airlines
with either a system-wide average passenger capacity below fifty-six seats
or a system-wide average payload capacity below 18,000 pounds."
227 The
purpose of the rate cap was "to encourage commuter service in Arizona
by giving commuter airlines flying small airplanes to rural locations a
lower effective tax rate." 228 Although America West did fly commuter
aircraft in Arizona, its system-wide average passenger capacity and its
system-wide average payload capacity exceeded the threshold for appli-
cation of the rate cap because America West also flew "much larger
aircraft on its interstate routes.,229 Consequently, none of America West's
aircraft qualified for the rate cap-not even its commuter aircraft.
230 In
deed, during the two tax years at issue, America West was the only
222. Amz. CONsT. art. IX, § 1.
223. Am. W. Airlines, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 880 P.2d 1074, 1076 (Ariz. 1994); see
Aileen H. Char Life Interest v. Maricopa County, 93 P.3d 486, 491 (Ariz. 2004).
224. Am. W Airlines, 880 P.2d at 1077 (quoting People's Fin. & Thrift Co. v. Pima
County, 38 P.2d 643, 645 (Ariz. 1934)).
225. Am. W Airlines, 880 P.2d at 1077.
226. 880 P.2d 1074.
227. 880 P.2d at 1075.
228. 880 P.2d at 1075.
229. 880 P.2d at 1075.
230. 880 P.2d at 1075.
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airline flying commuter aircraft to rural areas of Arizona that did not
benefit from the rate cap, which put the company at a competitive dis-
advantage because it paid approximately $436,000 more in tax than it
would have had the rate cap applied.23'
The Arizona Supreme Court held that the rate cap provision vio-
lated the uniformity clause of the Arizona Constitution because it
"effectively tax[ed] America West's commuter airplanes at a higher rate
than commuter aircraft used by any other airline for the same pur-
pose."23 2 In the past, the court had upheld the placement of the same
type of property in different classifications when that property was put
to different uses. But the court distinguished those cases on the ground
that the tax rate cap in America West Airlines effectively placed the same
commuter aircraft put to the same use in the same industry in different
tax classifications and subjected them to different rates of tax:
Although Apache County and Trico may allow the legislature to
place airline company property-a Ford truck, for instance-
in one tax class, put identical railroad company property-the
same Ford truck-in another, and tax them at different rates,
we deal here with a statute creating different tax rates for
property with similar physical attributes and productive-
ness, used the same way and for the same purpose by owners
in the same industry. If the uniformity requirement of the
constitution has any meaning-and it must-this goes too
far.233
Likewise, through its mini-DOMA, Arizona essentially applies two
different tax rates to couples' property interests in the legal rights (and
obligations) associated with their marriages, civil unions, and domestic
partnerships. To illustrate the disparity in treatment, let us return to
the earlier example of the two Massachusetts couples-one same-sex,
one different-sex, but both married and entitled to the same legal rights
and obligations under Massachusetts law as a result of their marriage. 235
231. 880 P.2d at 1075.
232. 880 P.2d at 1078.
233. 880 P.2d at 1078-79 (footnote omitted).
234. For a discussion of spouses' property interest in the legal rights (and obligations)
associated with marriage, civil unions, and domestic partnerships, see supra Part
III.A.2.
235. It is worth noting that the same comparison could be made between a married Mas-
sachusetts same-sex couple and a married Arizona different-sex couple. I have chosen
to continue with our earlier example both for the sake of simplicity and continuity
and because it better isolates the uniformity problem with the Arizona mini-DOMA.
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As described above,23 Arizona's mini-DOMA will compel the mar-
ried Massachusetts same-sex couple to take steps to shore up or
reestablish the legal protections afforded to them and their children by
reason of their marital status, should they wish to travel or move to Ari-
zona or to have dealings with individuals or entities there that implicate
their marital or familial status.237 These steps will entail significant finan-
cial costs for the drafting of legal documents, the hiring of ancillary
service providers, and the invocation of the machinery of the courts.238
As established above,239 those financial costs amount to nothing less than
a tax on this lesbian or gay family.
In contrast, Arizona imposes no analogous levy on the different-sex
couple, should they wish to travel or move to Arizona or to have deal-
ings with individuals or entities there that implicate their marital or
familial status. No tax is imposed on them because Arizona will, without
hesitation, legally recognize their Massachusetts marriage. 240
In other words, while the Arizona mini-DOMA imposes a tax on
the same-sex couple's property interest in the store of legal rights and
obligations associated with their marriage, Arizona imposes no tax at all
(i.e., an effective zero rate of tax) on the different-sex couple with regard
to its property interest in the store of legal rights and obligations associ-
ated with their marriage. Just as in America West Airlines, this differential
treatment should be found to violate the uniformity clause of the Ari-
zona Constitution because the law imposes different rates of tax on
property with the same attributes (i.e., Massachusetts marriages), used in
the same way (i.e., to facilitate the mutual protection and support of the
236. See supra Part I.B.
237. Because application of the mini-DOMA turns on whether the couple is of the same
sex and not on whether the members of the couple are residents or nonresidents of
Arizona (i.e., the Arizona mini-DOMA places the same burden on nonresident cou-
ples visiting Arizona, on resident couples who married in another jurisdiction prior to
relocating to Arizona, and on Arizona couples who leave the state temporarily in or-
der to marry or enter into a civil union or domestic partnership elsewhere), a
challenge under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV of the U.S. Con-
stitution would likely be unavailing. See 2 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 107,
§§ 13.8, 14.3(a).
While on the subject of federal constitutional challenges to the state tax im-
posed by the Arizona mini-DOMA, it is worth noting that a challenge under the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution is
not discussed here because, as mentioned supra text accompanying note 223, the uni-
formity clause of the Arizona Constitution, which embodies general equal protection
principles, imposes greater restrictions on the state's taxing power than does the fed-
eral Equal Protection Clause.
238. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
239. See supra Part II.B.
240. Asmz. REV. STAT. § 25-112(A) (2007).
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respective couples and their children), and in the same "industry" (in
this case, arguably the establishment and protection of family units).
Some might nevertheless be tempted to argue that the Arizona leg-
islature has drawn a reasonable distinction between these couples based
on whether they are of the same sex or different sexes. To put it in the
polemic of opponents of same-sex marriage, Arizona's mini-DOMA-
and any tax that it incidentally imposes-are necessary to encourage and
defend the primacy of so-called traditional marriage because, among
other reasons, (1) its universality supports the notion that it "is impor-
tant to the survival of a culture"; 241 (2) it "is the best context for rearing
children";242 (3) it encourages heterosexual behavior;2  (4) it "channels
potentially destructive energy into beneficial activity, especially for
men ;244 and (5) it "promote[s] individual flourishing" because
"[m arried people live longer and enjoy better physical and psychologi-
cal health and greater wealth." 245 Of course, all of these reasons for
encouraging and defending so-called traditional marriage are highly
contestable. Yet, even if taken at face value, these claims still should not
be sufficient to fend off a constitutional challenge under the uniformity
clause.
In an illuminating passage in America West Airlines, the Arizona Su-
preme Court rejected just such a public policy justification for the
distinction drawn by the taxing statutes in that case. As the court ex-
plained:
The sole basis for the discrimination is the number and size of
the other airplanes in America West's fleet. Because of its other
airplanes, America West's commuter airplanes, flying com-
muter routes to rural Arizona, are taxed at a higher rate than
the airplanes of its commuter competitors, whose fleets are
small enough to qualify for the tax rate limit .... The only
reason advanced for this unequal treatment is that a tax break
for small airlines may encourage the use of commuter equip-
ment to serve Arizona cities and towns that would otherwise
lack any air service. Although this may be a good and valid
reason, it is certainly not a property classification. We deal here
only with the latter.
241. George W. Dent, Jr., Traditional Marriage: Still Worth Defending, 18 BYU J. Pus. L.
419, 428 (2004).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 433-34.
244. Id. at 434.
245. Id. at 435.
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A property classification statute arguably might, for instance,
tax small airplanes differently from large ones or airplanes
used for rural service differently from those flying urban
routes. The classification thus made would be a classification
of property-based on one of the property's characteristics or
uses-rather than a classification of owners.246
To return once again to the example of our two Massachusetts cou-
ples, the classification being made by the Arizona mini-DOMA is not a
property classification. The statute is not treating the couples differently
because they have different property rights or put those property rights
to different uses. Indeed, as a result of their marriages in Massachusetts,
the two couples have precisely the same property rights and put them to
the same use. The only difference between the two couples is that one is
same-sex and the other is different-sex. To paraphrase the Arizona Su-
preme Court in America West Airlines, the Arizona mini-DOMA does
not delineate a classification of property based on its characteristics or
uses-the property has precisely the same characteristics and uses in the
hands of both couples-but rather establishes an impermissible classifi-
cation of owners in violation of the constitutional requirement that the
tax be imposed uniformly.
Viewed from this perspective, the Arizona mini-DOMA is an un-
constitutional tax on lesbian and gay families because it is not imposed
uniformly on the same class of property throughout the state.
C. Marrying Policy and Persuasion
Some states with mini-DOMAs do not have uniformity clauses in
their constitutions. And even where the constitutional challenges de-
scribed in the previous two sections of this Part are available, the courts
may ultimately decide to reject those challenges. In either case, the
reconceptualization of the DOMAs as a tax may still be of some effect.
The notion that the DOMAs operate as a tax on lesbian and gay
families can be deployed to affect the shape-or, at the very least, the
perceived fairness-of a jurisdiction's tax policies. Among the most often
articulated goals of tax policy is tax "equity," which is simply tax policy
jargon for the notion that we should strive for the fair treatment of tax-
payers. Typically, we speak of two different types of tax equity (or
fairness): horizontal equity and vertical equity. Horizontal equity aims to
ensure that similarly situated taxpayers are treated similarly, and vertical
246. Am. W. Airlines, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 880 P.2d 1074, 1078 (Ariz. 1994).
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equity aims to ensure that we develop an appropriate means of differen-
tiating the tax burdens imposed on taxpayers who are not similarly
situated (whether that be, for example, through progressive, propor-
tional, or regressive taxes)."'
Horizontal and vertical equity analyses usually take place with re-
gard to a single tax; for example, a commentator might discuss
horizontal and/or vertical equity issues raised by a given provision in the
248federal income tax. Nevertheless, commentators do also speak about
the equity of the tax system more generally. For instance, some com-
mentators speak of the estate and gift taxes as the most progressive part
of our federal tax system, because they are intended to apply only to the
241very wealthiest among us. Other commentators chide those who argue
that "'every American who pays income taxes' should benefit from tax
reductions- [because] ... that group includes the economically privi-
leged and excludes those among the working poor who do not pay
income taxes, but who do pay payroll taxes."250
In an earlier article, I criticized the blinkered focus of the conven-
tional conceptualization of tax equity on the economic dimension of
people, with its concomitant (not to mention wholly unrealistic) refusal
to acknowledge the many other lines along which our society is grouped
and divided (e.g., race, ethnicity, gender, sexual orientation, and disabil-
ity).25 1 In that article, I encouraged both mainstream and critical tax
scholars to recognize and question how the concept of tax equity "may
influence their thinking in unexpected ways" and urged them to work
to forge competing ideas about what makes a tax fair or just so
that we can break the ideological hold of the concept of tax
equity and replace it with something more meaningful that
addresses the impact of taxation not only on the dominant
group but also on all of the subordinated groups in our soci-
252ety.
247. See Infanti, Tax Equity, supra note 73, at 1193-94 & n.5.
248. Eg., Karen B. Brown, Not Color- or Gender-Neutral. New Tax Treatment of Employ-
ment Discrimination Damages, 7 S. CAL. Rav. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 223 passim
(1998) (discussing horizontal equity issues raised by amendments to I.R.C. § 104).
249. Eg., GRAETZ & SHAPIRO, supra note 82, at 3.
250. Infanti, Tax Equity, supra note 73, at 1257 (quoting Remarks on Signing the Tax
Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, 42 WaY. Comp. PREs. Doc.
943, 944 (May 17, 2006)); see, e.g., Deborah A. Geier, Letter to the Editor, Payroll
Tax Tilts Burden onto Poor, Middle Class, WALL ST. J., Nov. 27, 2002, at Al 1.
251. See generally Infanti, Tax Equity, supra note 73.
252. Id. at 1260.
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I must admit that I certainly did not expect to be taking up this task so
soon; however, I find myself doing just that now.
Returning, in a sense, to the earlier discussion of the figurative
sense of the word "tax" and its rhetorical power,25 one could attack the
DOMAs from a tax policy perspective on the ground that they single
out a certain type of family for disadvantageous tax treatment based
solely on that family's difference from the heterosexual norm. Viewed
from this perspective, can we really call a tax "fair" or "equitable" when
it adds to the tax burden of families headed by same-sex couples-who
already face significant tax (as well as social) burdens based on sexual
orientation25-when we do not impose a similar tax on similar families
headed by different-sex couples? In other words, should sexual orienta-
tion be a ground for differential taxation when it adds to the burdens of
those with the marginalized orientation?
Of course, some in the majority disapprove of same-sex relation-
ships and would likely support such differential taxation.255 But for
many, I suspect that imposing a tax on lesbian and gay families based
solely on their difference from the heterosexual, nuclear family norm
might just push things too far. Though the most recent census shows
that married couple households still predominate-they comprised 52%
of all households in the 2000 census-the brief on households and
families from that census underscores "the growing complexity of
American households." 256 In addition, the 2000 census showed a signifi-
cant increase in the number of same-sex and different-sex unmarried
partner households over the 1990 census: while the 1990 census found
3.2 million unmarried partner households in the United States, the
2000 census found 5.5 million unmarried partner households in the
United States.257 Given how common nontraditional living arrange-
ments are, taxing individuals based on a departure from the traditional,
nuclear family norm may be perceived as either (1) out of step with real-
ity or (2) threatening to the many people who would not be subject to
this tax, but whose living arrangements do not hew to traditional expec-
tations (e.g., people living alone, single parent families, unmarried
different-sex partner households, or extended family or group living
253. See supra Part II.A.
254. See generally Infanti, Deconstructing the Duty to the Tax System, supra note 73; An-
thony C. Infanti, The Internal Revenue Code as Sodomy Statute, 44 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 763 (2004) [hereinafter Infanti, Sodomy Statute].
255. See supra note 94.
256. TAVIA SIMMONS & GRACE O'NEILL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CENSUS 2000 BRIEF:
HOUSEHOLDS AND FAMILIES: 2000, at 1 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/
prod/2001 pubs/c2kbrO 1-8.pdf.
257. Simmons & O'Connell, supra note 92, at 1.
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arrangements) and who might reasonably fear future reactionary meas-
ures designed to push them into the traditional family form if this tax is
allowed to stand.
Moreover, recent polls have shown that a majority of Americans
support civil unions and the extension of at least some of the rights and
obligations of marriage to same-sex couples.258 Presumably, this same
majority would oppose the imposition of a tax on these same legal rights
and obligations. It would hardly seem fair (let alone productive or use-
ful) to give legal protections with one hand and then take them back
with the other.
Alternatively (and more controversially), same-sex couples could
argue that they already pay more than their fair share of state and/or fed-
eral taxes. The federal and state governments take tax dollars from
lesbians and gay men and often use that money to fund oppression on
the basis of sexual orientation. For example, the federal government has
used tax dollars from lesbians and gay men to prevent the District of
Columbia from implementing its domestic partnership regime for a
decade,259 to amend the District of Columbia's Human Rights Act to
allow Georgetown University to refuse to recognize lesbian and gay stu-
dent groups despite a court ruling to the contrary,26 to actively engage
in employment discrimination against lesbians and gay men through its
"Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, 2 61 and to provide rather precarious pro-
tections against discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to its
other employees.262 In addition, most state governments take tax dollars
258. Dan Balz & Jon Cohen, Poll Finds Americans Pessimistic, WASH. POST, Nov. 4, 2007,
at Al (in a national poll, 55% favored extending some of the legal rights and obliga-
tions of marriage to same-sex couples); Wyatt Buchanan, Field Pol: Californians More
Accepting of Gays, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 22, 2006, at BI (in California, 64% of respon-
dents favored either same-sex marriage or civil unions); Tim Craig & Jon Cohen, Va.
Voters Unhappy with Bush butAren't Blaming State GOP, WASH. PosT, July 15, 2007,
at Cl (in Virginia, a majority of respondents favored either same-sex marriage or civil
unions); Laura Smitherman, Majority Favors Legalized Unions, BALT. SUN, Jan. 17,
2008, at lA (in Maryland, 58% of respondents favored either same-sex marriages or
civil unions); cf Bill Salisbury, Voters Oppose Gay Marriage, Amendment, ST. PAUL
PIONEER PREss, Sept. 28, 2006, at lB (in Minnesota, 49% of respondents supported
legalizing civil unions).
259. Compare Act of Dec. 21, 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-96, 115 Stat. 923, 950, with Act of
Oct. 5, 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-382, 106 Stat. 1422, 1422.
260. District of Columbia Appropriations Act, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-168, § 141, 103
Stat. 1267, 1284 (1989) (codified at D.C. CODE § 2-1402.41(3) (2007)).
261. 10 U.S.C. § 654 (2007). For further discussion, see INFANns, supra note 3, at ch. 4.
262. The Bush administration was less than enthusiastic about enforcing these protections
and, through executive order, actually ended the unequivocal prohibition against dis-
crimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the granting of security clearances
that the Clinton Administration had put in place. See Christopher Lee, Groups Ap-
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from lesbians and gay men and, in return, provide them only limited
civil rights-for example, by providing them little or no protection
against employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation 263
and often no protection at all against housing-related discrimination on
the basis of sexual orientation. Furthermore, as described above,265 the
federal government and every state with a mini-DOMA force same-sex
couples who have married or entered into a civil union or domestic
partnership to fund their own government-sponsored oppression by ef-
fectively compelling them to incur legal fees, the fees of ancillary service
providers, and court costs in order to secure legal protections that they
should already have. And these tax dollars do not just go to pay the sala-
ries of the legislators who, to quote one reader of an earlier draft of this
Article, "pass the obnoxious laws." These dollars also go to pay for the
witch hunts to ferret lesbians and gay men out of the military;26 6 for the
judges who make it difficult (if not impossible) for lesbians and gay men
to obtain custody of, or visitation with, children from previous relation-
ships;267 and for the support of public institutions (for example, until a
few short years ago, my own university) that engage in employment dis-
crimination by providing lesbian and gay employees with lesser fringe
benefit packages than heterosexual employees.268
If the tax burden is to be fairly apportioned, lesbians and gay men
could argue, then the cost of such state-sanctioned, state-supported,
and/or state-facilitated discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation
should be funded entirely by heterosexuals. On this ground, same-sex
couples could argue that, until the DOMAs are repealed or struck
down, affording targeted tax relief (e.g., a credit against income, payroll,
and/or property taxes) to same-sex couples in order to balance out the
plaud Discrimination Ban, WASH. PosT, Apr. 10, 2004, at A3 (discussing the admini-
stration's resistance to enforcing prohibitions against discrimination on the basis of
sexual orientation for federal employees). Compare Memorandum from Stephen J.
Hadley, Assistant to the President for Nat'l Sec. Affairs, on Adjudicative Guidelines
for Determining Eligibility for Access to Classified Information to William Leonard,
Dir. Info. Sec. Oversight Office, at attachment, Guideline D: Sexual Behavior T 12
(Sept. 29, 2005), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/isoo/guidelines.htmIl, with Exec.
Order No. 12,968, § 3.1(c)-(d), 60 Fed. Reg. 40,245, 40,250 (Aug. 7, 1995). For
further discussion, see INFANTI, supra note 3, at ch. 5. So far, the Obama administra-
tion has been rather slow to address LGBT rights issues. See Michael D. Shear, At
White House, Obama Aims to Reassure Gays, WASH. POST, June 30, 2009, at Al.
263. INFANTI, supra note 3, at 113 tbl.5.1.
264. Id. at 121 tbl.5.2.
265. See supra Part I.B.
266. See Fiona Morgan, Inside a Lesbian Witch Hunt, SALON, June 8, 2000, http://
www.salon.com/news/feature/2000/06/07/lesbians/index2.html.
267. INFANTI, supra note 3, at 205-10.
268. Id. at 107, 117-19.
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financial and other269 Costs imposed by the DOMAs would be a welcome
first step toward the necessary recalibration of the overall tax burden im-
posed on them to make it fairer and more equitable.270 In the case of the
federal government, this tax relief could be afforded to all same-sex cou-
ples who live in a state that legally recognizes their relationship. In
keeping with the focus of this Article, the states with mini-DOMAs might
afford tax relief to currently and formerly out-of-state same-sex couples in
recognized legal relationships who have some connection with, or who
move to, the state.27 1 (In lobbying for this tax relief, in-state couples could
269. See, e.g., supra note 113.
270. Interestingly, this argument would actually bring the idea of tax "equity" more in line
with the conventional legal use of the word "equity," which usually carries reparative
or gap-filling connotations. Infanti, Tax Fqeity, supra note 73, at 1197-98.
Nonetheless, some might be concerned about the possibility of an equal protec-
tion challenge to this idea of targeted tax relief. But given the ameliorative nature of
the tax relief, the fact that sexual-orientation-based classifications have not been un-
ambiguously subjected to heightened constitutional scrutiny, and the leeway
generally granted to legislatures in distributing tax burdens, it seems unlikely that this
proposal would be susceptible to an equal protection challenge. See 2 ROTUNDA &
NOWAK, supra note 107, § 13.7(a) ("A review of the cases involving the issue of equal
protection of state tax statutes indicates that the Court generally defers to the judg-
ment of the state legislative bodies."); Purvi S. Patel, Eighth Annual Review of Gender
and Sexuality Law: Constitutional Law Chapter: Equal Protection, 8 GEO. J. GENDER &
L. 145, 175-84 (2007) (indicating that federal and state courts generally apply the ra-
tional basis test to sexual-orientation-based classifications, but acknowledging the
debate among commentators about whether the U.S. Supreme Court has, in practice,
applied a heightened form of rational basis review to such classifications); cf In re
Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (applying strict scrutiny to sexual-
orientation-based classifications, making it the first state high court to do so). If any-
thing, it would seem that failing to provide such targeted tax relief would raise a more
serious equal protection issue because lesbians and gay men are now arguably singled
out for the imposition of higher taxes than heterosexuals, simply by reason of their
sexual orientation. See generally Wolfson & Melcher, supra note 11 (arguing that
DOMA is unconstitutional on equal protection grounds because, out of antigay ani-
mus, Congress singled out lesbians and gay men for the imposition of an inferior
legal status).
271. Residents of a state with a mini-DOMA who leave that state to enter into a same-sex
marriage (or a civil union or domestic partnership) run up against the general rule
that an "evasive" marriage (i.e., one in which a couple leaves a state for the purpose of
avoiding a legal ban on their marriage) that is against the strong public policy of the
couple's home state is invalid. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2)
(1971). This rule renders the out-of-state legal celebration of the relationship sym-
bolic, at best, or grounds for discharge from the military or adverse immigration
consequences, at worst. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(b)(3) (2008) (making an "attempted"
same-sex marriage grounds for discharge from the military); INFANTI, supra note 3, at
155 ("[A] same-sex marriage, civil union, or domestic partnership may not only be
denied recognition [by the federal government] but may also serve as the basis for de-
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underscore the political oddity of providing tax relief to currently and
formerly nonresident same-sex couples, but not to same-sex couples who
are long-time residents of the state. By drawing attention to this distinc-
tion, they may be able to increase political support for repealing the state's
mini-DOMA as an easier and more equitable solution to the problem.)
Before going further, I would like to underscore the words "first
step" that might have gotten buried in the previous paragraph. Under
the argument articulated above, the targeted tax relief would be the
first-but not the only-step toward a necessary recalibration of the
overall tax burden. Other steps to adjust the tax burden on lesbians and
gay men would need to follow this first one if a fair distribution of so-
cietal burdens were to be achieved. Yet, by beginning with this one area
in which the government imposes a concrete, easily understood financial
burden on same-sex couples, lesbian and gay rights advocates would be
able to open the door to a wider conversation about how the unseen (at
least by the heterosexual majority) societal burdens imposed on the basis
of (homo)sexual orientation should be taken into account when distrib-
uting the more visible burdens that we all bear in funding our
government and paying for public services.
I am sure that many readers will recoil at this argument, likely out
of a reflexive resistance to the idea of differing tax burdens based on
noneconomic criteria. 27 Yet, it is worth pointing out that the direct tax
clauses of the U.S. Constitution not only countenance, but in most
cases would actually require, tax rates to vary based on the population of
each state-an indisputably noneconomic criterion.273 To take a more
recent example, as a candidate, President Obama proposed exempting
low-income senior citizens from paying federal income tax. 274 Though
entailing a hybrid classification, this proposal would clearly vary tax
rates based on age (i.e., younger low- and middle-income people would
not benefit from this proposal), and age, like population, is an indis-
nying renewal of a visa or reentry into the country (because it may be construed as
evidence of an intent to remain in the United States permanently).").
272. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Fiscal Poison Pill, N.Y. TIMEs, June 16, 2008, at Al9 ("one
wonders why we should create the precedent of exempting particular demographic
groups from taxes").
273. See EINHORN, supra note 159, at 158-60 (describing the problem and providing a
table indicating the range of rates that would apply in different states if our current
federal income tax were apportioned by population).
274. William E. Gibson, Two Prescriptions, One Sick Economy, SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-
SENTINEL (Ft. Lauderdale, Fla.), Aug. 1, 2008, at 1A; see also PLATFORM DRAFTING
COMMITTEE, DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION COMMITrEE, THE DRAFT
2008 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL PLATFORM: RENEWING AMERICA'S PROMISE 9
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putably noneconomic criterion for differing individual tax burdens. (It
is worth noting that this proposal is not unprecedented, as senior citi-
zens already benefit from an extra standard deduction that provides
them with a lower effective tax rate than others.)275 Accordingly, I would
urge those who might reflexively react negatively to the idea that lesbi-
ans and gay men should be taxed differently (i.e., in the case of at least
certain taxes, more lightly) than straight men and women to resist their
instinctive reaction to this idea and to consider this proposal seriously,
especially in view of the implicit constitutional imprimatur given to dif-
ferential taxation based on noneconomic criteria. (If, however, you
cannot resist this instinctive reaction, that's fine, too-because it will
only further undermine support for the DOMAs and militate in favor
of their repeal as a quick and easy means of avoiding a debate over how
best to vary the tax burden based on sexual orientation.)
Thus, even in the absence of more technical constitutional argu-
ments against the DOMAs, same-sex couples can still rhetorically use
the reconceptualization of the DOMAs as a tax on lesbian and gay fami-
lies in an attempt to affect the shape-or, at the very least, the perceived
fairness-of federal and state tax policies. This rhetorical move only
strengthens the attempt to displace the idea that the DOMAs are neces-
sary to protect the institution of marriage from some imagined assault
by same-sex couples and to replace it with the idea that the DOMAs are
really nothing more than an unjust penalty imposed on same-sex cou-
ples and their children because they happen to be different. Again, this
shifts the framing of the debate away from a focus on forcing states to
recognize the right of same-sex couples to marry, which tends to gener-
ate reflexive resistance among the many heterosexuals who are not ready
to take this step on their own, and toward a discussion of whether it is
fair to tax two similarly situated families differently-a framing of the
question that is of more general appeal because it is phrased in terms of
the widely held belief that those who are similarly situated should re-
ceive similar treatment under the law. Simultaneously, this move
enriches the debate over tax fairness by shunning the typically unbend-
ing focus on the economic life of individuals and by instead pushing us
to begin to think about how an individual's noneconomic characteristics
(here, sexual orientation) might be taken into account in assessing tax
fairness.
275. I.R.C. § 63(c), (0(1) (2008).
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CONCLUSION (OR, GREASING THE SLIPPERY SLOPE)
After spending much time (and spilling much ink) on the ways in
which the Internal Revenue Code overtly and covertly burdens same-sex
couples,2 76 I have shifted direction in this Article by considering how
other burdens that society imposes on same-sex couples might be recon-
ceptualized as a tax on lesbian and gay families. My purpose in writing
this Article has been severalfold. First, as part of a larger project of which
this Article forms a part,277 I hope to have shaken generally accepted no-
tions of what constitutes a "tax" and to have moved both mainstream
and critical tax scholars to question the contours and content of this
(and other) tax concepts that, on their face, appear to be normal, natu-
ral, or plainly incontestable.278 Second, I hope to have opened viable new
avenues for challenging the constitutionality of the DOMAs. Third, I
hope to have provided some new rhetorical ammunition to those
276. See Infanti, Deconstructing the Duty to the Tax System, supra note 73; Infanti, supra
note 10, at 27; Infanti, Sodomy Statute, supra note 254; Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Pro-
test, "A Homosexual," and Frivolity: A Deconstructionist Meditation, 24 ST. Louis U.
PUB. L. REv. 21 (2005).
277. See supra note 73.
278. Based on my experience in presenting this Article, I believe that I have succeeded in
achieving at least this goal. A common reaction to this Article was to try to raise every
possible scenario in which something could be recharacterized as a tax and to then
raise the specter that my analysis creates a slippery slope in which it seems like every-
thing is a tax. In retrospect, I found these discussions to be quite illuminating because
they raised a number of intriguing questions about how we, as lawyers, think. For in-
stance, does an idea or argument necessarily become less valid or valuable simply
because it might be applied in other areas or in ways that we might not like? Or does
that say less about the idea and more about the results that we wish to achieve or are
comfortable with allowing to occur--or, in this and many other cases, about the
types of discrimination that we still find acceptable? In addition, does an idea become
less valid or valuable because it pushes (erases?) the boundaries that we have come to
live within and that define the parameters of our comfortable intellectual lives? Or, as
described in the text below, might these attributes make the idea more valuable?
These interactions also serve as a mirror, reflecting-and clearly framing for
us-the conservative nature of the legal profession and legal academia. From the first
days of law school, lawyers are trained to fear slippery slopes. We are accustomed to
dealing with issues on a case-by-case basis, attempting to confine the results of our ar-
guments to the case at hand (and similar cases) and leaving other cases for future
treatment. By deliberately crafting an open-ended argument, this Article sets up a di-
rect conflict with the "lawyerly nature" of legal academics and seems to provoke an
instinctually adverse reaction. I would thus ask readers who have similarly thought up
a parade of horribles as they read this Article to step back for a moment and reflect on
why they had this reaction. Is it because of some flaw in my argument or is it because
of their own discomfort with losing control over their accustomed intellectual sur-
roundings?
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battling for lesbian and gay rights. In this regard, I hope to have helped
lesbian and gay rights advocates to shift this front in their battle for so-
cial justice to a new tax terrain that might just prove a more hospitable
spot from which to wage their campaign.
Finally and most broadly, I hope to have drafted a blueprint for us-
ing the tax system and tax rhetoric in future attacks on legal structures
that disadvantage nontraditional families (as well as others who share
our outsider status). This Article has directly addressed only the burdens
imposed on same-sex couples who have entered into a marriage, civil
union, or domestic partnership. But, having chipped away at the he-
gemony of so-called traditional marriage and the nuclear family through
a concrete example that is both easily accessible and understood, I hope
that others will take up this work and use these (or similar) arguments
to chip away at this hegemony on behalf of same-sex and different-sex
couples who have not entered into a marriage, civil union, or domestic
partnership; single parents; extended family units; persons living alone;
and others who do not hew to convention. They also suffer unique bur-
dens because of their difference from the norm-burdens that might
similarly be likened to taxes and might suffer from the same constitu-
tional and equitable infirmities as the DOMAs. Thus, in contrast to
those who worry about slippery slopes and carefully argue why the line
should be moved only just enough to include them within the privileged
circle,2 79 I hope to have applied a thick layer of grease to an already slip-
pery slope in order to ease the way for those who come after me. In this
regard, I view this project as an example of the transformative potential
of same-sex marriage28 0 -what some deride as an assimilationist act can
actually take on a revolutionary character when viewed in the proper
light. 281
279. See generally Eugene Volokh, Same-Sex Marriage and Slippery Slopes, 33 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 1155 (2005).
280. Infanti, A Tax Crit Identity Crisis?, supra note 73, at 709-10, 813-18.
281. See INFANTI, supra note 3, at 223-25 (describing how lesbian and gay parenting is a
transgressive act).
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